Andrew MacKinlay: Will the Minister give an assurance to the House that the new Bill of Rights will in no way diminish our existing Bill of Rights, in particular article 9. Will he assure us, indeed, that he will use it as an opportunity to reinforce article 9, which protects Members of Parliament from interference from outside, from people who would lean on and mislead Parliament before Committees, and that it will protect Members of Parliament from interference from the Executive, including MI5?

Andrew Love: Since the beginning of the year three teenagers have been murdered in my constituency by the use of knives. My constituents are shocked by this, and they are also are incredulous that any teenager can go down to a pound shop in my constituency and buy the largest knife ever seen. What more can my right hon. Friend do to strengthen the guidelines for shopkeepers and, perhaps more importantly, to strengthen the sanctions against them for selling such weapons to young people?

Edward Garnier: Last year 258 people were killed, and 64,000 were mugged, by criminals with knives, and 31 teenagers have been knifed to death this year. Does the Secretary of State remember that in 2001, as Home Secretary, he urged the police not to prosecute young people caught with knives, whereas now the Prime Minister says that they should be prosecuted. Having been caught out not providing enough prison places for serious offenders, Ministers are now demanding that the courts hand out community punishments to criminals who should go inside. In November, the Government will introduce legislation to make sentences fit the available prison space rather than the crime. Has not "Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime" now been exposed as no more than vacuous sloganising by a Government who have let down the law-abiding public? Do not the public have a right to a Government who are on their side, instead of a Government constantly trying to save their own neck?

Paul Rowen: In the light of continuing revelations about the allowances and salaries of MEPs, including the latest about funding for political parties being channelled through a company, can I ask the Secretary of State for Justice if he has had any discussions with his Opposition counterparts, the Electoral Commission or the Chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life to ensure that British MEPs are brought under the same ambit as MPs?

Jack Straw: May I just say to the hon. Gentleman that it is important that we put this matter into perspective? Very few young people are ever put into custody. The only reason that they are put into custody is that they have committed very serious offences. The number of children aged 12 in custody is seven. The bulk of those young people who are put into custody are aged 16 and 17—they are not children; they are often large, unpleasant thugs, and they are frightening to the public. In my judgment, the courts have been quite right to ensure that they are locked up, and locked up for a long time where they have committed grievous offences. Sometimes I read material that suggests that young people aged 16 or 17 are children, but the figures show that seven 12-year-olds are in custody and 1,450 17-year-olds. Of course we have responsibilities, which I discussed earlier, to ensure that when they are in custody, everything possible is done to ensure that they do not reoffend when they come out and that they lead a better life. However, for the protection of the public, I believe that the courts get it right in the relatively low number of cases where they jail offenders.

David Kidney: Do Ministers accept that reoffending rates are unacceptably high among those sentenced to prison sentences of less than 12 months? Are Ministers aware of a scheme in the west midlands called Connect, which provides close support for prisoners on release from prison, including mentors where appropriate? The scheme has been funded by European funding, which has come to an end. Does the Department have any policy of close support for people in those circumstances in order to prevent reoffending?

David Hanson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for drawing that to our attention. He will know that we are looking at two test-bed areas in the west midlands and the east region to bring together a range of services to help individual prisoners on release from prison to get into employment and housing, tackle long-term drug issues in the community and deal with problems such as alcohol abuse. He will also know that we are looking closely at promoting the use of community sentences where appropriate—indeed, I published a document last week—to ensure that we have alternatives to custody, particularly short-term prison sentences. Those alternatives can often be much more demanding on an individual, with courses on alcohol, drugs and other issues, than a short-term prison sentence can, as well as tremendously more effective in reducing reoffending. Indeed, I do believe, dare I say it, that some members of the Opposition Front Bench would also support that view, while others would not.

Jack Straw: I answered the hon. Member for New Forest, West (Mr. Swayne) about that. I wish that I could be more precise, but let me tell the hon. Gentleman, lest he was not listening when I was talking about this before, that our record on ensuring sufficient prison places for offenders is infinitely better than that of the previous Conservative Administration. At one stage, they did not have a couple of hundred prisoners in police cells; they had 3,500, and the numbers continued year after year. Every so often, when the previous Government ran into a crisis, instead of ensuring that more prisons were built, what did they do? They just released another 3,500 or more.

Jack Straw: I entirely share my hon. Friend's concern about this matter. The lack of representation from what she describes as more deprived areas across the country has got worse, not better. It is a matter that profoundly concerns the Magistrates Association and the chairs of benches as well as my colleagues and me. We are doing a lot of work on this issue, for example, although it may not be directly relevant to my hon. Friend's constituency, Operation Black Vote has been running a very successful mentoring scheme. I recently attended the final day of the scheme for this year and some hundreds of people from the black and Asian community who had never ever dreamt of joining the magistracy are now ready to do so. I would like to see such schemes extended—there are many already—to cover the white population for people who instinctively do not think about joining the magistracy, but would find it valuable. Above all, they would be able to bring their experience, from living in their area, to bear when they sit in court.

Jack Straw: I accept the burden of the hon. Gentleman's last point, which is that there should be independent assessment of what works and what does not, but I do not accept his view that the people's representatives in this House should not have a role to play in determining the level of punishment and in deciding what should be regarded as criminal behaviour. That is a responsibility—a fundamental one—on the shoulders of every single Member in the House; and so, in my judgement, it should remain.
	There will be and there always have been some categories of offender who do not get the point. It is not society, not even the Ministry for Justice, that is responsible for their offending; it is the offenders themselves who commit these crimes. What we have sought to do—I hope with all-party support—is to say to offenders: "We will give you a route out of offending if you want to take it, but if you don't, you will end up on an indeterminate sentence for public protection and you will not be released unless and until you can satisfy the parole board, an independent body, that the risk of your reoffending is infinitely lower than it was when you entered prison." I am pleased to say that more and more offenders who are in prison and who realise that they are going to stay in prison for a long time and do not like it, are now getting the point.

Sally Keeble: I beg to move,
	That leave be given to bring in a Bill to regulate prices charged for units of alcoholic drinks; to regulate point of sale promotions, advertising and labelling of alcoholic drinks; to establish an industry council to administer the regulation of prices and promotions; and for connected purposes.
	The Bill aims to tackle a growing and deeply damaging phenomenon in society: the widespread abuse of alcohol and, in particular, binge drinking. It is a phenomenon that we all see in our constituencies. We see the price that our communities pay in terms of ill health, crime, damage to young people and their education and, ultimately, damage to the economy. Last year a Cambridge university study put the total economic cost of economic misuse at £33.2 billion a year, including £3.2 billion in health costs.
	Alcohol misuse is an issue that we have considered frequently in the House, but so far we have tended to focus on the role of pubs and clubs. The Bill concentrates on the role of the retail industry, both supermarkets and smaller shops. There has been a growing awareness of the role of the retail trade in alcohol misuse, but there is now also a growing sense of public anger—expressed just this weekend by the chief constable of Nottinghamshire—at the deep discounting of alcohol which has caused beer to sell more cheaply than water.
	Some supermarkets have taken steps to try to manage their alcohol sales more carefully, and there have been a number of good practice codes. However, the continued toll taken on the public's health, their safety and their patience is a sign that those voluntary measures have not produced the necessary results, and that legislative steps are needed.
	Alcohol is accepted in our society. Almost all of us here enjoy a drink, and pubs are one of the great features of our country. Many of us—probably most of us here—will also drink too much on occasions such as holidays and celebrations. This is a difficult problem to tackle: we must draw a dividing line between something that is one of life's pleasures, and something that is the bane of our society.
	There is no fixed definition of binge drinking. The Department of Health describes it as drinking half the recommended weekly alcohol intake—about 10 units for men and seven for women, or five pints of beer for men and three and a half for women—in a single session. Some might think that, by today's standards, that is not a vast amount of alcohol.
	According to a Government report published in 2005, 23 per cent. of men and 9 per cent. of women said that they were involved in binge drinking. The numbers are increasing, and the consequences are appalling. Over the last nine years the incidence of cirrhosis has trebled, and it is now being found increasingly in younger people, including people in their 20s. The average weekly intake of alcohol by 11 to 15-year-olds has grown from five units in 1990 to more than 11 in 2005, and 13 children a day are now admitted to hospital with drink-related problems.
	Alcohol is a factor in 33 per cent. of burglaries and 50 per cent. of street crimes, and in just over half of all violent crimes. Just last weekend, a police officer was assaulted and hospitalised while trying to deal with a group of young people drinking on the streets of my constituency, and I am sure that all Members know of similar incidents in their constituencies.
	Underlying these statistics is the trend that alcohol is becoming increasingly available at very low prices. Although we in this country complain about taxes on alcohol, according to the Office for National Statistics the ratio of price to average disposable incomes shows that alcohol is 69 per cent. more affordable now than in 1980. There is a strong sense that it is time to set some real boundaries around the sale of alcohol, which is what this Bill seeks to do. It seeks to do it through four key measures.
	First, the Bill would provide for a compulsory system of labelling that obliged the manufacturers to show the number of units of alcohol in each container of drink, because in order to make responsible choices people have to know what they are drinking. Perhaps one of the worst examples of this is that a can of beer can contain 1.75 units or 4.25 units depending on the type of beer. That difference will have a dramatically different effect on people's ability to drive home from a night out, for example.
	Secondly, the Bill seeks to limit the promotion of alcohol in stores, for example by restricting sales to clearly defined and identified aisles. That would apply to smaller convenience stores as well as supermarkets, as it seems quite wrong that a community store designed for the sale of food should become taken over by alcohol sales, especially just before bank holiday weekends. Other countries have opted for tighter regulation, including the introduction of separate tills for alcohol sales within general stores or gated areas. Under this provision, it would also be possible to limit promotional material for alcohol, such as prominent counter displays of alcohol.
	Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Bill aims to stop the very deep discounting of the price of alcoholic drinks by setting a minimum price for a unit of alcohol. There are a number of different ways to deal with the very low prices of alcohol. Setting a minimum unit price would have no impact at all on the price of a pint in a pub or the cost of an ordinary bottle of wine at the supermarket. What it would stop, however, is very heavy discounting. This measure would also stop once and for all the "happy hour" type promotions, such as that of a pub in Northampton which advertises entry at £12 from 9 pm to 2 am with all drinks included; there would need to be a specification of how many drinks, and at what price.
	Finally, in order to set this minimum unit price and the standards for promotion, the Bill would provide for the introduction of an industry-wide council, which would include people from the industry as well as people with expertise from wider society.
	In looking at the options for this Bill, I met representatives of a range of organisations, and I would like to thank them for their time and input. Although some of the trade organisations obviously had reservations about some of the Bill's measures, none was hostile to it, and some were particularly supportive. Alcohol Concern, the Police Federation, the National Association of Head Teachers, the British Medical Association and the National Union of Students were strongly supportive and provided help, advice and information. Pubs and clubs were also supportive, as they felt that they had borne the brunt of the existing legal and fiscal measures to tackle alcohol abuse. I am very grateful to these organisations for their support and advice.
	Let me offer a final thought. Last December, a young woman was brutally and tragically killed by a gang of drunken youths for no reason other than the style of her clothing. One of the youths, Brendan Harris, aged only 15, admitted to what he had drunk—2 litres of cider, a bottle of Stella Artois and "quite a lot of" peach schnapps. Let us forget for a minute that he should not have been buying drink at all; at today's prices, that amount of alcohol at our major supermarkets would have cost him just £1.42 for 2 litres of super-strength cider—on special offer at £2.13 for 3 litres—33p for the bottle of Stella Artois, on special offer at 60 bottles for £20, and just £1 for his share of the £5.99 bottle of schnapps. That makes a total of slightly less than £3 to get so drunk. We are talking about up to 20.1 units of alcohol, which is twice the level of even a binge drinker, for just £3, and that has to be wrong. That kind of pricing and availability is not about a fair return for retailers; it is about completely irresponsible marketing, for which the public pay a very heavy price, and this Bill sets out to limit it.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	Bill ordered to be brought in by Ms Sally Keeble, Dr. Ian Gibson, Dr. Phyllis Starkey, Dr. Evan Harris, Lynda Waltho, Martin Salter, Mr. Don Foster, Margaret Moran, Mr. Charles Walker, Mr. Elfyn Llwyd, Mr. Gary Streeter and Ms Dawn Butler.

Alcohol Sales (regulation of Prices and Promotion)

Peter Bone: I am not sure that that has any relevance to this part of the proceedings on the Bill. What those on the Front Bench do is not my interest; am much more interested in the rights of Back Benchers to have their say on important matters. This approach reduces the importance of Parliament.

Douglas Hogg: The hon. Gentleman simply was not listening. I began by saying that Labour Members spoke on the 42 days, but to all intents and purposes they spoke on nothing else, perhaps because they did not know about the issues or they did not care, or they had been told by their Whips not to do so. Whatever the explanation, it is a dereliction of their duty. When the hon. Member for Reading, West (Martin Salter) comes along to grumble, he had best look carefully at the non-performance of those on his own Benches. Perhaps we have to treat that as water under the bridge, but we do not have to treat the programme motion as water under the bridge. It is a serious attempt to stifle parliamentary debate.
	The Report stage is an important moment, because those hon. Members who were not party to the Committee debates have an opportunity to scrutinise the Bill. This programme motion, like so many others of its kind, dissuades hon. Members from participating because they know full well that if they do and if they push things to a Division, it takes time out of subsequent discussion. My hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough was entirely right: if the Government had wanted to provide additional time, they most assuredly could have done so, because we all know full well that the parliamentary business over recent weeks has been remarkably light. The Bill is important but discussion has been stifled.
	By 6.30 pm, or thereabouts, we will have to conclude our discussion on parts 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8 together with that on clauses 24 to 27. That is about three hours to discuss 16 new clauses and about 60 amendments, and some of them are important. For example, there are important changes in the rules that govern post-charge questioning. There are very important changes suggested by Government Back Benchers on the making of control orders. I have tabled measures to improve defences in respect of offences committed under the Terrorism Act 2000. There are attempts to amend the notification requirements, which are extraordinarily oppressive. There are serious attempts in the selected amendments to amend the asset-freezing provisions, which, as currently framed, can bear harshly on innocent third parties. Those are all matters of substantial importance and we will not have an opportunity properly to discuss them. In truth, the chances are that a number of the groups of amendments will never be reached. I hope that the other place will not hesitate to impose amendments on the Bill, especially when this House has not discussed them.
	As regards the second part of today's business, the arguments are even more serious as we will be dealing with the provisions that relate to parts 3 and 6. Part 3 relates to the powers of the court to forfeit assets. We need to be cautious about such powers, because they can bear harshly on the offender and on innocent third parties. The House should have the opportunity to discuss amendments designed to protect the said innocent party. Will there be a vote on the matter, or will we be rushed through to the next clauses? I bet that we will. Important things will fall by the wayside.
	Then we come to the last group of amendments, which are probably the most important of all. They deal with inquests. The Government are seeking to do a number of fairly malign things. First, they seek to dispose of the jury inquest in an extraordinarily wide range of classes. Amendments have been tabled to restrict those classes. The Government are also seeking a power to nominate their own specially appointed coroner. Is that desirable at a time when the Government have been seeking through court action to gag coroners from making adverse criticisms of Government policy? Again, that is a matter that the House must discuss in detail. The truth is that in three hours, assuming there no relevant Divisions, the House will not be able to do that. In my opinion, that is a parliamentary scandal. We are not performing our historic duty. Worse than that, we are betraying our historic duty and that is an affront to democracy.
	This Government will not be in power much longer. They will be replaced by a Conservative Government, but I am glad that my party's Whip is present on the Front Bench as I have one final message to impart. I hope that he makes a careful note of the fact that I and others will support programme motions only in the most exceptional circumstances or when there is evidence of filibustering. Moreover, I do not expect to be asked to support such motions in the future.

Elfyn Llwyd: The Minister says that we finished an hour early, and I said a few minutes, so shall we agree on 60 minutes or 58? To be fair to him, the Minister engaged at all times in the Committee, and we had good debates.
	This Report stage is the final process in our consideration of the Bill. We should be collating the arguments and pulling all the strings together so that we can see exactly where we are before the Bill leaves for the other place. It is extremely important that all hon. Members, and not just those who were members of the Committee, can express their opinions. This is probably the most talked-about Bill for many years: it deals with dangerous terrorists—but we will be wasting the whole of Thursday on dangerous dogs.

Tobias Ellwood: I wish to place on record my thoughts on the comments of the hon. Member for Stockton, South (Ms Taylor) that the Committee had time to debate the serious matters in the Bill. Clearly, that is not the case. Back Benchers have not had the opportunity to express our views. If we are to believe the Prime Minister, who has made so many concessions on the Bill in order to woo Labour Members to ensure its passage, it is very important that there is sufficient time for us to understand the consequences of the Bill.
	I, for one, will not support the programme motion. It is wrong that we have had our debate curtailed, because those who did not serve on the Committee have not had time to debate the Bill.

Tony McNulty: They simply do not, because they can have an input on Second Reading and Third Reading, and at any subsequent consideration of Lords amendments. That is not just the purview of the Front Bench.

Tony McNulty: I will in a moment, because the hon. Gentleman did at least pop into the Committee, although not during the last week. As for the right hon. and learned Gentleman, how many of the 14 sessions did he attend? It was very good of him to pop in. He attended seven out of 14, as has been said. We know that he is a busy man down at the court, running the odd murder trial and everything else, so we are grateful, at the very least. The hon. Gentleman, who sadly could not join us in the last week, missed only four sessions.

Dominic Grieve: If I may say so, I think that the Minister is missing the point. I said that I made no complaint about the timetabling of the Committee stage, but the way in which we are ordering our business in the House on Report guarantees in almost every instance, even if the Government graciously grant us two days, that we cannot consider the amendments properly. That is a scandal that requires a little bit of consideration on both sides of the House as to how we solve it. At one time we solved it by sitting through the night. We have abandoned that. Unless the Government give us more days, we will continue to pass bad legislation because we cannot give it adequate scrutiny on the Floor of the House.

Counter-Terrorism Bill
	 — 
	[1st Allotted Day]

[Relevant documents: The Second Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 42 days, HC 156, the Ninth Report from the Committee, on Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Counter-Terrorism Bill, HC 199, and the Government Response, Cm. 7344, the Tenth Report from the Committee, on Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Annual Renewal of Control Orders Legislation 2008, HC 356, the Twentieth Report from the Committee, on Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Counter-Terrorism Bill, HC 554, and the Twenty-first Report from the Committee, on Counter- Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 42 Days and Public Emergencies, HC 635. ]
	 As amended in the Public Bill Committee, considered.

Tony McNulty: If the hon. and learned Gentleman will bear with me, I will come to that shortly.
	As I was saying, we think that confining post-charge questioning to new evidence could make all post-charge questioning subject to challenge on the basis of whether the evidence was available at charge. We also consider that there may be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to question the suspect about evidence available pre-charge—for example, analysis of evidence collected after charge could cast a new light on evidence that was available pre-charge. This is a dynamic process, as people will know.
	Amendments Nos. 15 and 16 would allow questioning after charge for offences other than the offence for which an individual has been charged—namely, a "related terrorism offence". The Government believe—and the matter has already been alluded to—that this is already possible. If, for example, the police charge a suspect with a lesser terrorism offence and further evidence becomes available that a more serious offence was committed as part of the conduct in question, the police could re-caution the suspect—or re-arrest them if on bail—and interview them about the more serious offence.
	We believe that judicial review of the transcripts of post-charge questioning is also unnecessary, as the trial judge could refuse to allow prosecution evidence if it was believed that it had been obtained by unfair questioning, including confessions obtained through the oppression of the suspect. It is also unclear what actions a judge reviewing a transcript would undertake, should discrepancies be found.
	Finally, amendments Nos. 13, 14, 45 and 46 would require codes of practice for post-charge questioning and pre-charge detention before the Bill could come into effect. It is already the case that codes of practice must be issued for post-charge questioning; as I have said, draft codes have already been circulated. With respect to pre-charge detention provisions, these will lead only to minor amendments to PACE codes. Although these will be done before anyone is detained pursuant to these provisions, having a statutory requirement for those codes to be issued and approved by Parliament before commencement is, we think, unnecessary, so I ask Members not to press any of these four amendments.
	For the reasons I have outlined, I commend Government amendments Nos. 57, 58 and 59, as well as Government new clauses 18 and 19, to the House. In doing so, I accept, as I acknowledged in Committee, that these are sensitive matters and that post-charge questioning is not a simple panacea. I also accept that a whole range of models of post-charge questioning are proffered by various experts.

Pete Wishart: The Minister will know of the particular sensitivity about how this provision will apply to the Scottish legal system. He will be aware that it is a principle of Scottish common law that when someone is arrested and charged, they become the ward of the court and it is crucial that nothing is done to prejudice his or her trial. Does he accept that there are issues, perhaps difficulties, with how post-charge questioning will apply to Scottish common law?

Tony McNulty: I do, just as there are in the broader sense of the common law base. That is what we are trying to get around. I genuinely believe that we have reached a place where post-charge questioning could work. It is a shift—a concession, in a sense—on my part from saying that it could all be done through PACE 2 to having some safeguards built into the Bill. I genuinely think that we have got the balance about right, notwithstanding what the hon. Gentleman says about Scottish common law. I commend the amending provisions to the House.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: That is not a matter for the Chair and I am sure that any omission will be put right as soon as possible.

Dominic Grieve: I thank the Minister for listening to some of the representations made in Committee on post-charge questioning. Although I shall have to disagree with him in a little while on one matter, I want to make it that clear that I am the first to acknowledge that the Government did listen that and that new clauses 18 and 19 reflect that. I go further and am prepared to acknowledge that Government amendments Nos. 57 to 59 also attempt to reflect some of the concerns raised in Committee about the process.
	It is almost universally agreed on both sides of the House that post-charge questioning is desirable in terrorist cases. That said, there has perhaps always been a slight tendency to see it almost as a panacea that can simply be wafted in without much further consideration. Plainly that is not the case, as the Minister acknowledged in Committee.
	First, as I have always accepted, post-charge questioning will not necessarily deliver all sorts of remarkable results. Secondly, when a person has been charged, one cannot simply ignore the fact that that point in the criminal justice process has been reached. Within a few hours, or overnight, the person is likely to be brought before a magistrates court. Under the fast-track procedure on committal that this country now has, the person is usually also in the Crown court within a very short period.
	The measure envisages the possibility of a person being interviewed, or re-interviewed, right up to the moment when the trial process begins. In those circumstances, it is perfectly obvious that injustice could take place, and that the process could also be oppressive. As the Minister acknowledged in Committee, were any of those things to take place, at worse the trial process might be vitiated as unfair, in which case we would not get a true verdict and someone might escape prosecution, or it might result in the end of the prosecution process altogether. It is therefore in everybody's interests that we succeed in getting things right.
	In new clauses 18 and 19, the Government have done exactly the right thing in respect of video recordings and the PACE codes. I greatly welcome that, and we will support them. But the Opposition continue to have a difficulty over whether judicial authorisation should take place. The Minister thinks that judicial authorisation or scrutiny would be ponderous. My feeling is that it need not be ponderous at all. If he will consider our amendments Nos. 16 and 15, he will note that we have moved the process from the High Court, as we discussed in Committee, to the Crown court. In all probability, much of the questioning will take place when the defendant is already before the Crown court, and the Crown court judge, who might eventually do the trial or whatever it might be, will already be seized of the matter.
	Making an application to the court ought not to be a complicated matter; it is a matter of someone attending a Crown court for a couple of hours on a weekday morning for the sorts of applications that take place routinely in criminal justice proceedings. In most cases, I am absolutely confident that the judge, having considered and had the reasons for a further interview being required explained to him, would have absolutely no difficulty in giving the authorisation. Such a process would provide for a level of scrutiny, whereas the Government's proposals, to which I shall return, seem not to do so. Slightly more bizarrely, the Government have made a move in our direction about providing a measure of judicial scrutiny, but in a way, as I shall try to illustrate in a moment, that will not really make any difference.

Dominic Grieve: The application should be inter partes, but an inter partes hearing in front of a Crown court judge need not take up an enormous amount of court time. All that needs to be done is for the prosecution to indicate to the defence that it wishes to re-interview and that it has the grounds to fulfil the necessary criteria. It is possible, of course, that the defendant will consent to being re-interviewed. If he consents with his lawyers present, I do not see why the interview should not proceed without an application, but if there is an argument over it, presumably the matter could be put before a Crown Court judge who could reach a decision after considering the circumstances. He could also exercise a watching brief, so that if a problem arose, an application might again be possible.

Dominic Grieve: I am happy to press the Minister to answer that question, but I think that I can almost give my right hon. Friend the answer now. In Committee, we discussed the number of times that the problem was likely to arise. We need only consider the number of terrorist cases. Mercifully, we are not so burdened with those at present that such circumstances are not unusual, and I do not believe that they will arise very often.
	The other reason I think the circumstances will not arise very often—and it is one of the reasons I consider Government amendment No. 57 to be deficient—is that people who have been detained for a long time without charge have not necessarily been questioned for very long. Amendment No. 57 would allow a person to be questioned for 24 hours, although obviously not continuously, on the authority of a senior police officer. Only after that would it be necessary to obtain permission from a magistrate to continue the questioning for another five days. It is at that point that I begin to feel that the Government are not really addressing the issue.
	We know that there have been two instances in which a person has been detained for up to 28 days and subsequently charged. As it happens, I have the figures before me showing the amount of time in those 28 days that those people were actually questioned. One was questioned for 13 hours and 29 minutes in all, while the other was questioned for 14 hours and 34 minutes. In one case, the longest interview lasted for one hour and 58 minutes, and in the other it lasted for one hour and 37 minutes.
	After the 14th day of detention, one defendant was not interviewed on 14 days in the subsequent 14-day period, and the other was not interviewed on 11 days. The figures break down as follows: in the case of one, 38 minutes on day 19, 14 minutes on day 20, one hour and 11 minutes on day 26, and 15 minutes on day 27; in the case of the other, 54 minutes on day 19, one hour and 58 minutes on day 20, and one hour and 17 minutes on day 26.
	Quite apart from illustrating the fact that interviewing is probably not the central aspect of the problem of investigating offences, those figures emphasise that if amendment No. 57 were passed, the chances are that it would have no impact whatever on the present position, because the chances of someone being interviewed for 24 hours post-charge are so negligible that they can be entirely ignored. If we are to allow post-charge questioning with some supervision, which the Minister has begun to concede in certain cases, we may as well grasp the nettle and say that it should apply in all post-charge cases. That would obtain whether the Minister were minded to adopt our amendment No. 15 or new clause 4.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and I agree. Although I am sure that there are different ways of approaching this—and I am always conscious when proposing an Opposition amendment that it will often be easy to find flaws in it as it would have been drafted without having all the benefits provided by civil servants—I would be grateful if the Minister could respond to amendment No. 16 because it seems to me to set out a perfectly sensible and rational way of proceeding. It says:
	"A police officer of at least the rank of superintendent may make an application to a judge of the Crown Court...A judge may grant permission...if satisfied by evidence that:
	(a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the original charge was appropriate to bring; and
	(b) it is in the interests of justice to allow further questioning in the circumstances"
	and:
	"Where a judge grants permission for further questioning...he shall make such directions as he considers appropriate with regard to:
	(a) the maximum permitted period...
	(b) the total length of time over which further questioning is permitted; or
	(c) any other directions as required in the interests of justice."
	Furthermore, we use the expression that I picked up with the Minister: a "related terrorism offence", which
	"means a terrorism offence arising in whole or in part from the same set of facts as the offence with which the person has already been charged, or officially informed that they may be prosecuted."
	That is included because I have always had the slight anxiety, which the Government do not appear to share, that there may be a successful challenge to the notion that just because a person is charged with a particular offence, we can automatically go and charge them with another. My gut instinct is that that might be wrong because, in practising criminal law, I have been of the impression that if the matter arises entirely from the same facts, at present there may be objection, although I am conscious that the Minister has been advised—by his civil servants, I think—that that is not the case. To help the Government and because I would much rather that this situation did not arise, we have used the expression a "related terrorism offence", which I hope effectively covers that point.

Dominic Grieve: My right hon. and learned Friend raises an interesting point, although, at this stage, I fear that we shall have to consider it in another place. However, in trying to approach the debate in the same spirit that I know the Minister has approached it—I repeat my gratitude to him for having taken on board the matters that have been raised—let me say that the Government have the opportunity to look at this further so that we have a system with which we are all happy.
	I do not want to take up much more of the House's time, so let me simply reiterate that I do not believe that judicial supervision will produce any obstacle to achieving what the Government want. I do not think it will take up time. I do not even think it will cost very much. For all those reasons, it would be wise to include it in the Bill.
	Just so that the Minister knows it, our position is that we will welcome new clauses 18 and 19, but I say with some regret that we will vote against amendment No. 57, because we would like the opportunity for our amendment No. 16 to be put before the House. Alternatively, if the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) chooses to press new clause 4 to a Division, we will also support him. With that in mind, I hope that whatever the outcome of this evening's debate, the Minister will examine this matter as the Bill goes through the House of Lords. I have no doubt that their lordships will be taking an interest in the matter, and it is in everybody's interest that we should get it right.

Andrew Dismore: I am grateful to have the opportunity to follow the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), and I agreed with everything that he has had to say about this matter. I am also grateful to my right hon. Friend the Minister for the way in which he has approached it constructively and has moved the debate on a bit. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the honour of chairing, first recommended the introduction of post-charge questioning as long ago as July 2006 as a way of improving prosecution and as a human rights-compliant alternative to pre-charge detention. The proposal was part of a wider package of measures that we suggested.
	I accept, as the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield has done, that this measure is not a panacea. I also accept the comment of the former deputy assistant commissioner, Peter Clarke, that it is unlikely that a suspect would answer questions after charge, because they do not do so pre-charge. The important fact is that the measure would give us the opportunity to draw adverse inferences at trial if a suspect was not prepared to co-operate.
	The Government say that the measure does not breach article 6—the right against self-incrimination—and we agree with that, but only if the right safeguards against the oppressive use of post-charge questioning are put in place. That view is shared by Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. His report on the proposed measures for this Bill stated that the provision
	"would require careful amendment to the current Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Codes of Practice, or an additional and specific Code."
	He says that that is particularly the case with regard to
	"limitations on its extent, and...protection of the suspect from arbitrariness."
	In particular, he mentioned the importance of judicial supervision of the exercise of the power and the need to amend the code to
	"include protection against repetitive or oppressive questioning."
	That view was shared by the eminent Professor Clive Walker and Professor Ed Cape, who is a criminal law professor, when they gave evidence to our Committee. They both expressed their strong concerns about the need for a number of detailed safeguards, particularly because the situation is different after charge, when the accused is in a particularly vulnerable position compared with the position pre-charge. Although many of the physical conditions could be dealt with in the PACE codes, it is important to set out in primary legislation the purpose of the questioning, the limitations on it—in particular, that it should be confined to new evidence—and the need for judicial supervision.
	My new clause 4 would give effect to a series of recommendations proposed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its eighth report on counter-terrorism policy, published in February 2008, and in its 10th report on the subject. I am pleased that the Government have accepted some of our recommendations in principle and that we have made progress on others, although decisions remain on some.
	The two key issues are those highlighted by the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield: judicial authority and the time limit for questioning. In their original responses, the Government merely said that it is the prison governor's responsibility thoroughly to scrutinise the request, as they do for post-charge interviews and other matters—and that was about it. Our view was pretty clearly that that was an inadequate safeguard.
	We now have the proposal on authorisation for 24 hours by a superintendent—presumably, that is again subject only to what the prison governor may or may not have to say about it, and that is not much of a safeguard—and the possibility of authorisation in chunks of five days by magistrates. Of course, it is not just one batch of five days; it can be repeated five days at a time. Some progress has been made, but the position is a long way short of the safeguards that are needed.
	I stand by our report's view that there should be judicial supervision. We have judicial supervision of pre-charge detention, for the purpose ultimately, I suppose, of questioning the suspect, so what is wrong with post-charge questioning also being subject to that judicial authority? Why choose the magistrates? We can only assume from the explanation that we have been given by the Minister that the magistrates would be expected to undertake rather less scrutiny of the police and Crown Prosecution Service request than a High Court or circuit judge would do. We are told that it might slow down the process, but it is less time-critical because we are talking about after charge, not before.
	I am very concerned about the five-day chunks, because they could become oppressive. We could end up with a cat and mouse game with the suspect. There is no reason why the police should not be able to organise their questioning before they start. We must also bear in mind that a suspect may be on bail, because the offence is not one of the major or serious ones. In that case, the suspect could be rearrested and interviewed in detention for five days at a time.
	We are also concerned about the sort of evidence that should be put to the suspect. We accept the argument that it should include new evidence that has come to light post-charge, such as computer decrypts or evidence from overseas that could not reasonably have been received before, but there is a risk of oppressive questioning if old evidence is regurgitated and old questions are put again, effectively giving the police a second bite at the cherry. The new draft PACE code seems to be on the same wavelength as we are with that point, but our view is that, because this is such an important development, the safeguards should be in the Bill.

Andrew Dismore: Ultimately that will be for the judicial authority to decide, but we are talking about a case in which, say, a computer has been seized and is in the possession of the police, but has not been decrypted. If the decryption comes after charge, it would be reasonable for that evidence to be put to the suspect. Similarly, if another suspect turns Queen's evidence and decides to confess, that is evidence that could not reasonably have been available to the police before. It is a question of common sense. We added that provision to our original intentions to cope with scenarios in which new evidence came to light that might have been available before, but could not have been put to the suspect for those sorts of reasons. That part of the new clause is clear.
	We wanted to provide for the presence of the defendant's lawyer, and the Government have accepted that in principle in the draft PACE code. It is an important safeguard that should be included in the Bill.
	We also want the interviews to be video-recorded, and I am pleased that the Government's amendments will provide to that effect. My right hon. Friend the Minister has explained that the exceptions that troubled me in new clause 18(2) were to cover Scotland, so I shall not press that point.
	New clauses 4, 7 and 8 would require the judge to review the transcript and provide that there should be no questioning after the start of the trial. The Government appear to agree with the second point, but say that that should be up to the trial judge. Our view is that such a safeguard should be included in the Bill, primarily to ensure that the rules are followed. It should not be left to the uncertainty of how a trial judge may react. For example, if a case is adjourned—

Andrew Dismore: I agree, but unless it is excluded, one cannot say for sure that it will not happen. The PACE code seems to be heading in that direction. Let us suppose that a trial were adjourned for some reason. The trial judge could allow questioning to go ahead because there was time for it. The only way to prevent that for sure and ensure that the rules are kept is to include a provision in the Bill. That is why we also want to provide that the judge should review the transcript of the examination of the suspect, because the judge can then check whether the parameters laid down when he or she gave consent have been properly followed. That would effectively mean that the whole process would be subject to judicial supervision, which is what Lord Carlile and the eminent professors seem to recommend and with which we agree. We should not leave those fundamental and essential safeguards to the uncertainties and vagaries of a trial judge, who may react in a different way.
	To conclude, we certainly welcome the introduction of post-charge questioning. There is a considerable measure of agreement about the safeguards. We need in particular proper judicial authorisation and fair maximum time limits to avoid oppressive questioning and the risk of no fair trial, which would be the case if new clause 4 were not accepted.

Tom Brake: I, too, want to start my comments by thanking the Minister for what he has taken on board from the concerns that were expressed in Committee. I am sure that other Opposition Members have had the experience of serving in Committee when a range of amendments have been tabled, many of which are perfectly straightforward, and none has been taken on board. Here, we have an example of some having been taken on board and the Government coming back with their own proposals. From that point of view, it has been a positive experience.
	It is clear that there is almost universal consensus that post-charge questioning is necessary, but there is also almost universal consensus on the limits of its effectiveness. The Minister has said that it is not a silver bullet, and all Members in the House and who were in Committee would agree, because terrorists are inclined not to respond to questions. Post-charge questioning should be part of the panoply of tools or measures that are at our disposal to tackle terrorist cases.
	I am pleased to say that, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the Liberal Democrats can support all the amendments, from the proposals tabled by the Government to those tabled by the official Opposition and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Government's proposals create a system of safeguards over post-charge questioning, including judicial oversight by justices of the peace after the first 24 hours and video recording of the interview.
	The Conservatives have tabled a group of amendments that involve an application to the Crown court, which can then judge the legitimacy of the case and set out conditions. The Minister described those amendments as creating a burden, but there are clearly cases where it is worth creating a burden because a contribution is made. Members often bemoan the number of forms that the police have to complete, but there are some good reasons why some of those forms are completed. They create a burden, but they make a positive contribution. The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) eloquently set out why, if there were a burden, it would be strictly limited.

Douglas Hogg: I want to make three points. First, my amendment No. 46 proposes that post-charge questioning should not come into effect until the codes of practice have been approved under the affirmative procedure of this House. However, the Government's new clause seems to meet that objective, and I welcome it.
	My second point has to do with judicial supervision, which I believe should be conducted by the Crown court rather than by the justices. To that extent, I very much support new clause 4 and the amendments tabled by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). It is preferable that a Crown court judge—who in any event is likely to be seized with the case—should have the supervisory role, rather than the justices. In part, that reflects my unease about the justices' courts, which are not always as fully aware of the relevant facts as perhaps they should be.
	My final point relates to the law of unintended consequences. It is obviously right that we should lay down the statutory framework within which the judicial approval for post-charge questioning should be sought, but I am slightly troubled that we may have produced proposals that would prevent post-charge questioning when that is what alleged offenders want. For example, they may want to have their previous statements clarified, or they may have found material that supports what was said in previous interviews. In such circumstances, they may want to be interviewed again, post-charge.
	I am not absolutely clear in my own mind as to whether what we are discussing now would preclude that happening, but it might, and the Government should reflect on that possibility. I recognise that we cannot resolve the problem today but, if my anxiety turns out to be well placed, the other place is the proper place for that.

Elfyn Llwyd: Not necessarily: the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said that some new evidence might be thrown up that caused the defendant or the accused to reconsider what he or she had said earlier. That does not preclude the possibility that people could be re-interviewed. In any event, it seems that none of us in the Chamber is able to offer an answer on that point, but I accept what the hon. Gentleman says: there is an important debate to be had.
	On new clauses 18 and 19, the Minister said in Committee that he would consider the issues, and to be fair to him, he has certainly done that. Interestingly, he also said:
	"I do not entirely dismiss judicial oversight and all the detail; I simply ask the Committee to lay those matters to one side for now. Let us go away, have a further look". ——[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism Public Bill Committee, 8 May 2008; c. 338.]
	To be fair, that is what he did for many points to do with the Bill, but I ask him now to look at new clause 4, which has the authority of the Joint Committee on Human Rights behind it. The new clause is very useful, and the Government might well consider accepting it in due course. I do not disagree with the Conservative amendment either; I am really hedging my bets on this one. With the bets that I have made, I hope to get a horse in the top four.
	Of the myriad issues that we started off with in Committee, the only two left are the issue of judicial oversight and the question of the length of post-charge questioning. We are so near agreement that it would be very good if we were able to reach it. The Minister said in Committee that we could leave some matters to the trial judge, because he would decide at the beginning of a trial whether the questioning was oppressive, and so on. That is one way of doing things, but it would be preferable to provide for limited judicial oversight. The judge concerned would not have to be from the High Court; a circuit judge would be fine, I am sure. People apply for public interest immunity certificates to gain the right not to have certain evidence disclosed in an ordinary criminal trial. Those certificates are two a penny. They are granted all the time, and they do not take very much time from the judge's list. It typically takes perhaps half an hour before the judge resumes his list. That would be an important, valuable safeguard. To be fair to the Minister, he has come a long way on the issue.

John Gummer: None of us would like to be churlish about how far the Minister has moved on the issue. I agree with the previous speaker that the Minister has done particularly well in reacting to many issues that were raised in Committee proceedings, which I have read but did not attend. I emphasise that even though the significant change that we are discussing has all-party support, it is important that it be implemented with due consideration for its seriousness. The Government have come under a good deal of pressure for seemingly intending to take draconian measures when they are not necessary. The change is a valuable example of taking a sensible measure in a non-draconian way, which gets support of the kind that we need in order to ensure that the special arrangements that we make for our counter-terrorism activities are accepted as suitable within a democratic society. Most of us ought to be concerned that we do not alienate people because we go against our own philosophy.
	The concept of going to a judge in the Crown court to get his agreement for post-charge questioning is not just a technicality. It would ensure that everyone realised that that was a step to be taken for a reason, not a step to be taken as part of the normal activity. That is all we are asking, and it has an importance outside as well as to the people who are charged, for it says once again that we are fiercely supportive of a judicial system that is designed to enhance as well as to protect our reputation as a free society. That is why the provision must be introduced. That is why I posed the question earlier, and why I would still like the Minister to tell us how often he envisages the procedure being invoked, as it emphasises the way in which we regard the matter.

Tony McNulty: Just let me finish this point. I am not being unjustly or over-critical about new clause 4 or the amendments tabled by the hon. and learned Gentleman, but if they were passed in place of what I have offered, they may or may not sit with the changes made to the PACE code, they may or may not sit with new clauses 18 and 19, and I would ask the House to take my miserable offerings, albeit with some movement forward, because they are cohesive with the other two; then there might be a chance later to tidy up all the movement that I have made.

Tony McNulty: This opens up other areas. As I said earlier, not just for the process but for the Crown court judge concerned, it could be over-burdensome and over-time consuming for something that should be relatively straightforward. We quite deliberately say—this was another element on my road of discovery—"justice of the peace" rather than "magistrate", because apparently a justice of the peace is a magistrate available 24 hours a day rather than otherwise.
	My hon. Friend has made a fair point in the sense that, for the sake of cohesion, the draft changes to the PACE code, new clauses 18 and 19 and amendment No. 57 hang together. Those measures have been offered as one package, and they should be passed by this House in those terms. If we were to go further in the direction of new clause 4 towards a different model of judicial oversight, rather than the magistracy model, it would be a matter for the other place.

Andrew Dismore: This group of new clauses and amendments relates to control orders. When we debated the renewal order in February, the control order regime was subject to considerable criticism. I agree with the Government that the control order regime is the second best option after prosecution. If the control order regime is to stay, we must review the safeguards and ensure that it is compatible with human rights law. We are discussing restrictions on liberty without a criminal charge or trial.
	New clauses 5 to 7 refer to the importance of prosecution; new clause 8 relates to the nature of control orders themselves; new clauses 10 to 15 concern due process; and new clause 16 relates to an exit strategy. In the case of E, the House of Lords said that there was an implicit duty on the Government to keep the possibility of prosecution under review. Baroness Hale said that control orders were second best and that the public were far better protected, because even while criminal proceedings are pending, the controlled person is subject to serious restrictions on the basis of mere suspicion.
	I welcome the introduction of the control order review groups' quarterly meetings to consider whether prosecution can take place, but not one controllee has ever been prosecuted. New clause 5 would put an extra check on whether prosecution was possible by requiring the Director of Public Prosecutions to certify that there was no reasonable prospect of prosecution before an order could be made. We know that the DPP is quite important in such matters from the debate that we are likely to have tomorrow.
	New clause 6 would make statutory the duty to keep matters under review. It is current practice; the Government agreed recently with the control order review group. In the case of Secretary of State for the Home Department  v. E, they argued that they needed to have only periodic inquiries into whether the matter should go forward, so we need to ensure that the provision is included in the legislation. It is also important to ensure that the police see all the material available to the Home Secretary. They may well be able to turn some of what is currently inadmissible into admissible evidence; they have had some success in doing so in other terrorist cases. Lord Carlile, in his third report on control orders, made the point that the continuing investigation of current controllees could provide evidence for prosecution and conviction, so the new clause would give effect to his recommendation, too.
	New clause 7 would provide for more transparency in the process and, again, would give effect to a recommendation from Lord Carlile in his third report, when he said that more detail about the reasons why there were no reasonable prospects of prosecution should be given by the chief of police to the Home Secretary. The new clause would also give effect to recommendations from Lord Carlile's first report in 2006, when he said that the reasons should be disclosed to the controllee unless it would be contrary to the public interest to do so. The new clauses would give effect to his recommendations in those two reports.
	New clauses 8 and 9 are about the nature of the control order and whether it amounts to a deprivation of liberty—against article 5 of the European convention on human rights. If it does, it should become a derogating control order. That would happen only if the courts authorised it. Whether the order amounts to a deprivation of liberty is a question of not just the length of the control order, in terms of the number of hours per day, but the conditions imposed in combination. In the case of Guzzardi  v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights found that when combined with other restrictions, nine hours maximum amounted to a deprivation of liberty. We must have a more nuanced approach than simply stipulating the number of hours and a curfew.
	Lord Bingham in the case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department  v. JJ said that one should take account of the individual's whole situation, and that it was inappropriate to draw a sharp distinction between a period of confinement that would amount to a deprivation of liberty and one that would not. New clause 8 would make that point in the Bill, looking at the overall factors that must be taken into account.
	The period of daily confinement is, of course, important in the overall assessment, and new clause 9 therefore seeks to limit the daily length to a maximum of 12 hours. There is no guarantee that it would be compliant with article 5. After previous court cases, the Government reduced some periods to 12 hours. In fact, there is little evidence of any significant damage to public protection in reducing control orders to 12 hours. If there were any such evidence, the Government should and would have produced it by now.
	The Government extrapolate that 16 hours is permissible from the judgment of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood in the JJ case. That is a rather strange extrapolation, because he actually said:
	"It may be, indeed, that 16 hours itself is too long" ,
	but that he wanted to leave it to the Strasbourg Court to decide. That is hardly a ringing endorsement of the Government's view that 16 hours is permissible. We have no clear judicial guidance and Parliament therefore ought to form its own view, which my new clause would enable it to do.
	The most important issue that we must face is the lack of due process. New clauses 10 and 15 are based on the recommendations that we put forward in our 10th counter-terrorism report in April. They are rooted in the evidence that we received from the special advocates who deal with such cases. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister will meet them, as he has promised to do, to discuss their concerns further.
	Once a controllee enters the twilight zone of dubious legality, he faces restrictions on where he can go and when, who he can meet, his use of his phone and computer and his transfer of money and goods. He also faces requirements to report to the police, to allow the police into his home without a further warrant and many other restrictions. The controllee enters a Kafkaesque world in which, like those unfortunates who were brought before Henry VIII's Star Chamber, he is not told of the case against him, is not allowed to discuss his case with his special advocate, sees the case against him decided on the ground of mere reasonable suspicion and, at the end of the process, is not given the reasons why the order against him was made. On that basis, people have been subjected to controls for three years so far, and remain so indefinitely—in some cases on top of three years' previous detention without trial in Belmarsh. We know that the security services can make mistakes, not only in the de Menezes case but in the Lotfi Raissi case which has had such a serious impact on an innocent man for the rest of his life. It is essential that safeguards are brought into play so as to have at least some element of due process in the control order regime if they are to continue to be used to protect the public.
	The Government say that the House of Lords approved their procedures in the MB case, but some of our criticisms were upheld—for example, on the entirely undisclosed nature of the prosecution case. The Government have ignored the evidence given to us by the special advocates, and the guidance on MB is somewhat confusing. Indeed, another case is going to the Court of Appeal next month. This area of the law desperately needs clarification. I accept that some of the points that we have put forward are not required in relation to MB, but they are needed to achieve a modicum of fairness. New clause 10 would avoid the need for mental gymnastics by ensuring that the controllee would be entitled to a fair hearing. There is a lack of certainty in the Bill that needs correction.
	New clause 11 would require an explanation to be given to the controllee of why the grounds for the control order were made out. New clause 12 would require the controllee at least to be aware of a summary of the material—the gist—which fairness requires him to be able to comment on. New clause 13 would allow the special advocate to apply to the court for authority to discuss aspects of the case with the controllee. That would be a safeguard from the security services' point of view. It would ensure that there was an independent assessment so that the special advocate did not disclose matters that he should not disclose, but at the same time provide a degree of fairness. New clause 14 would provide a procedural protection for what was happening on a scale concomitant with the seriousness of the conditions to be imposed. New clause 15 would allow a rebuttal of expert evidence to be brought. Together, these new clauses, which are based on recommendations from the Joint Committee on Human Rights and rooted in the evidence that we received from the special advocates, would provide a greater degree of legal certainty and procedural fairness, which are essential if the control order regime is to continue into the future.
	We should also consider the duration of control orders. Seven of the 15 people involved have been under control orders for more than two years, and two for more than three years, on top of three years' detention in Belmarsh that was later found to be unlawful. Not one of them has ever been prosecuted. Nine controllees were serving deportation notices and six have been deported. One control order has been revoked and two were not renewed. Lord Carlile drew our attention to the fact that after that length of time such people are of somewhat questionable utility to terrorist groups, which prefer to operate with "clean skins", not those who are so clearly compromised. The restrictions on freedom may not be Guantanamo Bay conditions, but they certainly provide a gilded cage in which people are confined indefinitely, and we therefore need to see an exit strategy. My new clause suggests a sunset clause of a maximum of two years on a control order unless there are exceptional circumstances. There is no clear human rights argument as to what should be the maximum length of time, but that chimes with Lord Carlile's recommendation of a maximum two-year presumption unless there is a genuinely exceptional need. It is a question for Parliament to debate and decide.
	Control orders are definitely a second best option to prosecution. We have to ensure that they are not unduly oppressive, that they are subject to due process and procedural fairness, and that there is ultimately and end to them in sight.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) and his Committee have done the House a good service in coming up with these new clauses and amendments and an opportunity to debate control orders. Many in this House will remember our original debate on the introduction orders in 2005. It is rather engraved on my heart as a debate that went on for some 36 continuous hours of ping-pong between the other place and this House. The curiosity of that debate was that although considerable anxiety had been expressed about the introduction of control orders, the issue on which consensus eventually disappeared was whether we should have a sunset clause on the measure to ensure that by bringing it to an end within a reasonable period the House would have to revisit it and think afresh.
	I sometimes think that the opinion of those of us who wanted a sunset clause has been borne out by events. In fairness to the Government, I can fully understand why they have been coming back to the House year by year asking for the renewal of the power. I suspect that no one in this House likes control orders; certainly, none of us should. I think that I used the word "repellent" to describe the concept when we debated them in 2005, and I have seen nothing since to make me change my mind. The principle of enforcing restrictions on individuals and their liberties without the ordinary trial process is something that we cannot be happy about, although I have always accepted that there may be a necessity in view of the threat that we face. Being realistic about it, I can see that the Government are in a position to continue making a powerful case that renewal may be needed for the foreseeable future. All the more reason, therefore, why we should take the opportunity provided by the Bill to revisit what the architecture of control orders involves.
	The Committee chaired by the hon. Member for Hendon has made an extremely important contribution to this debate, and the amendments that he has tabled are extremely valuable, even if each one probably needs to be considered separately. On new clause 5, the principle that there should be a requirement for a certification process that prosecution is not possible is one of the important safeguards that should be introduced into the control orders system. I do not doubt the Government's good faith, and I have no reason to doubt the good faith of the Crown Prosecution Service, in respect of the fact that every effort must be made to ensure that individuals who are subject to control orders are prosecuted wherever possible. I leave to one side the debates that we have had about intercept evidence. I do not want to return to that subject and get bogged down in it, although I believe passionately that it might be of some assistance, if not a panacea, to have intercept evidence admitted. Nevertheless, it would be a valuable contribution to have a situation whereby, irrespective of whether we have intercept evidence, the Director of Public Prosecutions can provide such a certification process on the basis of the available evidence that is admissible in court. I very much hope that the Minister might feel able to respond positively to new clause 5, because I find it difficult to see why any rational individual should object to it.
	Many of the hon. Gentleman's other amendments are very sensible. I am bound to say that I am sympathetic to his view that there should be a finite period for control orders that do not involve a derogation. It might be premature for the Government to accept it at this stage, but I think that it is time for us to look carefully at the relationship between the special advocate and the person who is to be made subject to a control order to see whether we can make the system more flexible to enable better representation to take place.
	Perhaps more controversially, the hon. Gentleman raises in new clause 9 the possibility of restricting to a period of 12 hours control orders for which derogation is not required. We are certainly in a grey area. We seem to have some confidence that 14 hours may be acceptable, but that 16 hours may, in some cases, not be acceptable. Having greater certainty might be valuable, but it is a matter on which I would want to hear from the Minister what he thinks would be appropriate.
	I can only repeat that I am grateful to the hon. Member for Hendon for having introduced the new clauses, but before I allow time for further debate, and mindful of the fact that we have only half an hour to conclude the debate on this group, I repeat my view that new clause 5 merits the Government's acceptance, even if they cannot accept anything else. Such acceptance would be a symbol of their good intent, and I do not see how it would interfere with the current system. If they are prepared to make some concession in the proposed direction, they will be in a much better position, when we come to renewing control orders next year, to say that they have made some progress in this matter.
	If the Minister were minded to look sympathetically at new clause 5, and perhaps assure us that even if he does not accept the other new clauses, the process of debate in the other place might prove productive in seeing whether we can adopt some of the suggestions raised by the hon. Member for Hendon and his Committee, the House would have made good progress this afternoon. I would then be in a position to say even nicer things to the Minister at the end of the debate on this group than I did at the beginning. New clause 5 is important, and I hope that the House has an opportunity to express its view on it.

John Gummer: I am not opposed to control orders, but I see them very much as a last resort. I return to the continuous concern that whatever we do must be seen in the context of accepting last resort measures only when they are necessary. It is for that reason that I support the request that the Minister should agree to new clause 5. We need to remove from the penumbra of control orders any aspects that can be reasonably seen, as the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) said, to be redolent of circumstances in which powers were used in a manner about which we feel sorry in retrospect; one aspect is a constant understanding that there is no alternative, albeit the alternative of a trial and prosecution. That is one of the things we have to do to earn the right to have control orders in a free society.
	The Minister can help the Government to recover their necessary reputation on such issues, which perhaps has been lost because of their determination to push in what many of us feel to be an illiberal direction on a number of other issues, some of which we shall come to later tomorrow. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) is right to suggest that it would be much more elegant for the Government to accept the changes than to allow them to be put to a vote. I use the word "elegant", but I mean that it would be useful for the Government if they were seen to understand what some of us have felt it necessary to harry them about—their attitude in the matters that we feel unhappy about. They could show themselves able to reinforce the consensus, even among those of us who accept the need for control orders, that such orders should be subject to regular review. That could begin with the suggestion that it is necessary to ensure that there was no alternative. That is, after all, not much to ask in a free society.

Elfyn Llwyd: Briefly, I, too, appreciate the work done by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) and his Committee. Like the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), I believe that it would send out a good sign if the Government were prepared to consider new clause 5.
	Personally, I am adamantly opposed to control orders, but they are a reality, and we are told that they serve a purpose. The proposals in the group would go some way towards ameliorating some of the concerns out there about the use of control orders. Requiring that
	"the DPP has certified that there is no reasonable prospect of"
	a successful prosecution is not asking a great deal in the circumstances. If a person has been put on an 18-month or two-year control order, with stringent conditions attached thereto, that requirement is the very least that we could call for. New clauses 6 and 7 propose the periodic review of whether there is a reasonable prospect of prosecution, which is also utterly reasonable, bearing in mind the huge limitations on the liberty of the individuals who are the subject of such orders.
	The proposals are all well meant and would improve the control order mechanism. They would not render the mechanism unworkable or in any way less effective, but they would—if I can use this word—humanise it and send out a positive signal to the people out there who are desperately concerned about the purport of such orders. In so doing, the proposals would address quite a few of the human rights questions on this area of law that concern us all.
	With those few words, I fully endorse the ideas behind the new clauses and amendments in the group. I urge the Minister, as others have, to consider accepting new clause 5 at the very least.

Tony McNulty: I, too, welcome the work of the JCHR on control orders. Indeed, dwelling on control orders has become one of its fixations; and, given their unique and extraordinary nature, quite rightly so for a Joint Committee on Human Rights. I therefore do not deprecate its work at all. However, the Government would look to the highest court in the land, the House of Lords, for our legal reference point, rather than the JCHR, however munificent it is.
	To tackle things backwards, I do not accept anything in new clauses 10 to 15 that challenges directly the conclusions of the most recent House of Lords judgment on the process and whether a fair trial or otherwise has been accorded under article 6. Nor do I accept the passing reference that my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) made to the dubious legality of control orders. We might not like control orders; they might sit in a twilight zone and they might be deeply unsatisfactory compared with persecution—I do apologise; I meant prosecution—which of course they are, but it is simply not good enough to say, "We're against them."
	On one level, we are all against control orders. I start from the premise that the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) set out of "as much normality as possible". In fact, in passing, I got into trouble last September for saying that the strongest lesson that we should have learned post-7/7 was that the rules of the game had not changed, and not the opposite. That was indicated by the Government of whom I was part at the time.
	I will therefore resist the blandishments of my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon on new clauses 10 to 15, however well intentioned the work of the Joint Committee was. We think that they are unnecessary. Given the choice between a report, however well intended, by the JCHR and a judgment by the House of Lords, we find ourselves, as we always are, of course, on the side of the Law Lords.
	There is much to commend in the broad thrust of my hon. Friend's new clauses 5, 6 and 7 on the renewal of control orders, as, from memory, I think I indicated last time. However, the formalisation that he seeks simply goes too far. There are reasons I do not think that it would be appropriate always to go for non-urgent control order certification by the DPP, as proposed by new clause 5. My hon. Friend will know that the Lords scrutinised the matter at length. They concluded that no changes to section 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 were required. The Lords considered that there were "strong practical reasons" for the current approach and that the changes would have the
	"potential to emasculate what is clearly intended to be an effective procedure".
	As I have already said, consultation arrangements are built into the legislation. As I think I said at the last annual review, should we make it clear that the processes for reviewing the potential for prosecution are all the sharper and clearer? Yes, we should. Should we look seriously into—and prove that we have looked seriously into—exit strategies for particular individuals? Yes, we should. Indeed, we have set out a range of ways in which we are seeking to do that. However, there are both principled and practical reasons for me to resist the substance of new clause 5, if not, in part, the spirit.
	First, new clause 5 could leave a public protection gap. A control order may be necessary to protect the public from the risk of terrorism posed by an individual, even though prosecution of that individual is possible. For example, an individual may be on bail, pending trial for a relatively minor offence and so the risk posed by the individual is much greater than the bail conditions that a judge would lawfully be able to impose on the individual, meaning that a control order is imposed in the interim to manage that risk.
	Secondly, new clause 5 could damage other investigations or prosecutions, or otherwise damage the public interest. My hon. Friend will be more than aware that, in addition to the purely evidential threshold, the Crown Prosecution Service is obliged to consider prosecution in the context of the wider public interest. Thirdly, and more practically, the proposal would be resource intensive and does not take account of operational realities.
	By the by, if that last point were the only one, the proposal would not be sufficient, given the seriousness of the deprivation of liberty. Taken together, all three points militate against accepting new clause 5. However, I accept the spirit, if not the intent, of the comments that my hon. Friend and the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) made in saying that we need to be as clear as possible that we have considered everyone's collective preference—that is, prosecution—in great detail and that, in addition, we have properly reviewed the prospects for a prosecution in future and an exit strategy. In part, that is what my hon. Friend is trying to get to in new clause 6. Again, however, new clause 6 as drafted, and probably—without imputing any malign intent—in intent, is inappropriate.
	It is important that we do not undermine the independent role of the CPS and the police. Very often—I say this merely in passing and no more—the very committee that should be more jealously guarding than any other the difference between the police, the CPS and the various arms of the state, and the interaction between the judiciary, the legislature and the Executive, couches some of its reports in terms that suggest that the Executive run the judiciary and legislature, which is not entirely appropriate.  [ Interruption. ] I thought I heard my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), but he points to the Liberal Democrat Benches—he must have thrown his voice.
	The independence of the CPS and the police is important. The CPS, not the Secretary of State, is responsible for considering whether a person should be charged with a criminal offence. Any shift in that responsibility could undermine its role. So the notion of the review group looking at the future prospects for prosecution is, given the interface between the police and the CPS, appropriate. I would say that the proposed new subsection (6A)(a), (b) and (c) are unnecessary. The statutory obligations of the 2005 Act, combined with court judgments, already deliver the intention behind the amending provisions, and the courts have confirmed that the Secretary of State must consult the police on the prospects of prosecution and do what she can to ensure that the police's consideration is meaningful by providing any relevant information available to them. We looked into the matter at the last review and we undertook to try to achieve that significantly better and in a clearer way, but it is not necessary to build it into the Bill in the way that my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon intends in new clause 6.

Tony McNulty: For precisely the reasons that I have just outlined—namely, what that might do to broader public protection, what it does in respect of resources and what it may well do to the interface between the decision on whether to prosecute an individual and the myriad of other potential prosecutions going on around it. The threshold test does not live or die on its own in this or any other regard; and alongside that is the notion that the prosecution is in the public interest. The interplay between the three factors is important. It is not to denigrate here or anywhere else the role of the DPP, but it is important to understand the interface between those three elements. I wholly appreciate the professional role of the DPP and, of course, the Crown Prosecution Service, to date and subsequently.

Dai Havard: I believe that the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) raised the question about the legitimacy, particularly the political legitimacy, of the process with the general population and the people who may be subject to these orders. Surely the safeguard is that people affected would have some sort of verification that someone in the process, such as the DPP in whom the Minister invests a lot of confidence, is involved. Is that not only politically useful, but useful in respect of the utility of the process?

Tony McNulty: But I—or, rather, the courts—have already suggested that we are obliged to ensure that the review and monitoring of the prospects for prosecution are constantly kept under review. That is already an obligation imposed by the courts. It is the specifics of the certification by the DPP that troubles me in relation to the interface between resources, other prosecutions that may be germane and the very real risks relating to public protection.

Dominic Grieve: On the Minister's point about the DPP, I find it difficult to envisage circumstances in which it could be said that it was in the public interest to subject somebody to a control order, but not to prosecute them when the evidence on which to do so was available. That is the first point. The second, which I would add in a spirit of being conciliatory to the Minister, is that I did not mention amendments Nos. 11 and 12. They are relatively minor, but they would deal with the introduction of some retrospective legislation, to which we profoundly object. We will vote against retrospective legislation even though we have no objection to what the Government are otherwise trying to do.

Tony McNulty: That is entirely fair and I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for dropping me a note to explain that he was going to do that. I am happy with that.
	In summary, in respect of where the House of Lords is now in view of the latest judgment—to be perfectly fair, it was not as clear as anyone would want in respect of article 5 or 6 or more generally—it is a sort of score draw for everyone. I have already said that I do not regard new clauses 10 to 15 as appropriate or necessary, given what the House of Lords has said about the process. I also disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon about the "dubious legality" of control orders overall, but it is right and proper for him to have tabled the provisions to allow us to discuss them. I repeat that it may seem churlish to be against new clauses 5, 6 and 7 and to resist the invitation to stay in emollient mood and carry on skipping happy-clappy into consensual uplands—that might even prevail tomorrow, who knows?—but I shall do so, not least because the absolute formulaic formulisation, if I may put it in those terms, of those new clauses does not aid the process of securing greater clarity and greater efficiency in the use of control orders in the way intended. That is true because of the obligations we are already under from the courts to do much of what my hon. Friend suggests.
	That is not to say that if the amending provisions are not passed, what remains and pertains at the moment is perfect. With the gallant assistance of the courts, we are regularly getting clarity about what should or should not prevail in respect of control orders. I do not doubt that that clarity will continue irrespective of whether the new clauses are passed. In effect, the courts provide as useful a safeguard in the broader sense as possible in dealing with circumstances that I accept are, given the normality of the backdrop of our rule of law, abnormal. I do not doubt either that my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon will, with assistance at the other end of this building, ensure that these matters continue to be up for discussion. As I said at the annual review, given the unsatisfactory nature of control orders, it is right and proper that they should be. I am afraid, however, that I must in the end disappoint the House by resisting the amending provisions.

Tony McNulty: These amendments relate to three distinct provisions in the Bill: UK-wide jurisdiction, aggravated sentencing and forfeiture. Clause 28 creates UK-wide jurisdiction for terrorism offences. A number of concerns about the clause were raised in Committee, and I hope that the House will agree that Government amendments Nos. 60 and 9 respond to those. It was pointed out fairly in Committee that there was at least potential for the clause's provisions to mean that an individual could be transferred to the Northern Ireland jurisdiction and fall straight under the non-jury trial provisions there. As I said in Committee, that was never the Bill's intention on jurisdiction, which is why I undertook to examine the matter further.
	Perhaps I may explain some of the background to this matter. The non-jury trial arrangements in the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 are extremely narrowly drawn, not least in the wake of the peace process, which is happily unfolding. They are designed to deal solely with the residual risks to the administration of justice created by community and paramilitary-based pressures on jurors in Northern Ireland. Sadly, jurors in Northern Ireland remain vulnerable to threats to the safety of themselves and their families, and bribery and blackmail are used to influence jurors to reach particular verdicts. Those issues are exacerbated by the small, close-knit nature of communities in Northern Ireland, and they remain so acute that the special arrangements in the 2007 Act were put in place to ensure that fair trials could be delivered and that the safety of jurors could be protected. There is a presumption for jury trial in all cases, and non-jury trial will be available only in exceptional cases. That is the opposite of the Diplock arrangements, whereby the default was non-jury trial for certain offences. I have been told, nay upbraided, by the Home Office lawyers that I cannot call this Diplock by shorthand and that I must refer to non-jury trial.
	A non-jury trial can take place only if the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland issues a certificate on the basis that he is satisfied that one or more of the conditions in the legislation is met and, in view of that, there is a risk that the administration of justice might be impaired if the trial were to be conducted with a jury.
	The conditions are the following: first, that the defendant is a member, or associate of a member, of a proscribed organisation connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland; secondly, that the offence was committed on behalf of a proscribed organisation connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland; thirdly, that an attempt has been made to prejudice the investigation or prosecution of the offence by, or with the involvement of, a proscribed organisation connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland; and fourthly, that the offence was committed as a result of, in connection with, or in response to religious or political hostility—the serious sectarianism that still prevails, happily only in some small part, in Northern Ireland.
	As the House will have noticed, the first three of the conditions are expressly limited to proscribed organisations connected to the affairs of Northern Ireland. Although the fourth condition implicitly refers to Northern Ireland, not least because it is in a Northern Ireland-related Act, it could be interpreted as allowing the transfer of cases to a non-jury trial in Northern Ireland where the terrorism is not connected to the affairs of Northern Ireland.
	I appreciate—rather laboriously—that amendment No. 60 would thus ensure that a case could not be transferred to a non-jury trial solely on the basis of that fourth condition. In other words, a prosecution could be transferred from Great Britain to a non-jury trial in Northern Ireland only where it was connected to the activities of a proscribed terrorist organisation in Northern Ireland and where the other conditions set out in the 2007 Act and clause 28 are met. The likelihood of circumstances arising where all those conditions would be met is extremely low, and, as such, I believe that the amendment provides sufficient reassurance that a defendant could not be transferred to Northern Ireland under the jurisdiction provided by clause 28 with the result that he be tried without a jury—the Committee mentioned that—unless his offence was connected with a Northern Ireland terrorist group, in which circumstance we feel that it is appropriate to preserve the DPP for Northern Ireland's discretion to provide for the trial to take place without a jury under the regime that has been put in place to take account of the particular challenges facing the administration of justice in Northern Ireland.
	The non-jury trial system in Northern Ireland is risk-based, which means that only those cases where non-jury trial is necessary to ensure that the administration of justice is not impaired are tried by a judge sitting alone. I thought that the reasons outlined in the Committee's debate were perfectly fair, and, as I indicated, it was not the Government's intention to have people presented to a non-jury trial in Northern Ireland, erroneously or otherwise, in that context. The amendment is a laborious if elegant way—that might be a contradiction in terms—to get round that and to ensure that what the Committee did not want to happen does not happen.
	Amendment No. 9 arises from the deliberations of the Committee. It proposes to remove subsection (7) of clause 28 to ensure that measures providing UK-wide jurisdiction for terrorist offences cannot have retrospective application. The Committee was, quite fairly, at pains to express that point. Although we could envisage a cross-border incident occurring before the jurisdiction provisions are implemented, that is unlikely, and if it were to occur there could be separate prosecutions, as at present. I am therefore content to remove the subsection, and I ask hon. Members to support the amendment.
	If I may, I shall speak just to the Government amendments. I shall, of course, respond to hon. Members as they propose their own measures. I might, thus, have some time to get rid of this fly, which has been pestering me for the past half an hour.

Dominic Grieve: I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman makes. Perhaps because I am a Conservative I am a believer in conventions. If a convention appears to work and not require further amplification, I am loth to interfere. The Government, of course, have been good at interfering with conventions and disposing with them in the dustbin of history, and that is regrettable.
	It is worth noting that the Lord Advocate is somewhat unusual in that she has survived a regime change in Edinburgh. She has also survived a slight and subtle, but significant, change in her constitutional role.
	Given what the Lord Advocate has said so emphatically, I would be loth to interfere. I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's anxiety, and perhaps I can reassure him by saying that if there were to be a serious difference of view on an issue of the kind we are discussing, it would create a mini constitutional crisis and the House would have to return to the issue. The smooth running of constitutions depends not only on our getting a series of rules right. If an established relationship is so clear and self-confident—at both ends—that no one has ever seen a problem on which there has not been a meeting of minds, I would be loth to interfere with it.

Dominic Grieve: The disadvantage would be that where a relationship works well without such a requirement—and is therefore seen perhaps as a pillar of the good working of our Union, which I support—I would not wish to see its having to be qualified with even the suggestion that it would require some statutory clarification in certain circumstances. For that reason, I would not support the amendment.
	The Liberal Democrats have also tabled amendment No. 112, which would require a jury to determine the issue of terrorist connection. We debated this point extensively in Committee, and I can see the force of the argument. However, as a lawyer, I am mindful that such issues are currently resolved on the voir dire by the judge alone. I shall be interested to hear the Minister's comments on the point, but I would be hesitant about interfering with that principle just because it is a terrorist case.
	Last, but by no means least, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) has tabled several amendments on forfeiture, which are highly pertinent. He has not had an opportunity to develop those amendments, and I shall finish speaking and let him do so. I hope that the Minister will respond in detail to what he has to say, because the issues are relevant. We need to protect the individual and when passing such legislation we need to ensure that it works fairly.

David Heath: Is not the difficulty the huge elevation in tariff that is possible by applying the terrorist tag to an offence that would otherwise be relatively minor? That is the difficulty and why those tasked as the finders of fact should be involved.

Mark Durkan: The Minister spoke on Government amendment No. 60 and said that the non-jury court provisions in Northern Ireland are not, according to his notes, the Diplock courts. There have been changes in the past couple of years. The House passed legislation to do away with the emergency provisions in Northern Ireland in 2006 and then provided the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 to bring back a number of those emergency provisions, including non-jury trials, essentially continuing the Diplock courts. They might have been on a different basis, but they were non-jury courts none the less.
	The Minister referred to the fact that under the 2007 Act the DPP for Northern Ireland will issue a certificate deeming that there will be a non-jury trial. That certificate is not challengeable in a court or by a court. None of that is changed by the Government's amendment. As the Minister said, the DPP has four grounds to use for a certificate and does not have to declare any of those grounds on the certificate. No one has any way of challenging it, judicially reviewing it or anything else. The person concerned, their lawyers, the general public and everybody else will not know which of the four conditions the DPP decided was satisfied and therefore warranted a non-jury trial.
	The first condition arises if the accused is a member of a proscribed organisation or has at any time been a member of an organisation that was at any time proscribed. The DPP will make that judgment and nobody will know where it has come from, on what information it is based or even what the organisation might be. Condition two is that
	"the offence or any of the offences was committed on behalf of a proscribed organisation"
	or that such an
	"organisation was otherwise involved with, or assisted in, the carrying out of the offence".
	Again, nobody will know any of the details. Condition three is that
	"an attempt has been made to prejudice the investigation".
	Of course, there is the issue of whether someone is an associate of a member of a proscribed organisation, too. None of the conditions is changed by the removal of the fourth condition by the Government's amendment. The fourth condition is that
	"the offence...was committed to any extent (whether directly or indirectly) as a result of, in connection with or in response to religious or political hostility".
	In so far as the amendment reduces the grounds on which the highly arbitrary certificates can be issued, we welcome it as a departure from the norm in Northern Ireland. It will mean that the DPP will no longer be able to issue such a certificate to demand a non-jury trial simply because the crime has been religiously or politically motivated.
	That is a small, welcome improvement, but it does not take away from the fact that we still have continuity when it comes to Diplock courts. The Minister might say that his notes say they are not Diplock courts, but we cannot believe that they are not when they are non-jury trials determined for unchallengeable reasons. The certificates do not have to state any grounds or any evidence. Indeed, when the 2007 Act was being passed, the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), told us that the DPP could act simply on the basis of information given to him by the intelligence services. He even said that the DPP could simply say to the judge—the judge might want to ask in advance, and could be told privately—that it was based on certain information, but that nothing could be said or asked in court.
	Although I welcome the fact that the Government have seen fit to chip away at one bit of the provisions for non-jury trial that they belatedly added to the 2007 Act, they do not go far enough. Of course, we have the odd situation whereby as a result of the legislation passed last year—and of this Bill, if it is passed—the DPP for Northern Ireland will be able to insist on non-jury trials on grounds that are completely secret and unchallengeable if a terrorist offence is related to the affairs of Northern Ireland, but if it is a wider terrorist offence, there will be an absolute guarantee of a jury trial. That is an odd anomaly to ask the people of Northern Ireland to accept. If the group is al-Qaeda, a jury trial will be guaranteed. However, it will be a non-jury trial if it is some other group, name and link unstated and unspecified, with no evidence produced in court, with the court not allowed to ask questions and with people left to think the worst—in fact, some hon. Members went so far as to want the 2007 Act to be amended to ensure that a court could draw an inference from the fact that a certificate had been issued. Clearly, Northern Ireland needs even more revision of the 2007 Act than the Government amendment provides. The amendment is a very limited improvement. It is welcome to that degree, but we need to see a lot more.
	I am not in any way as hostile to or critical of amendment No. 9. We have a more chequered view of the amendments tabled by the Lib Dems and the Tories. I can see the sense of some of them, but I do not think that others necessarily add any significant improvement to the Bill. In fact, they might create some technical difficulties.

Douglas Hogg: The hon. Gentleman says that the point of principle should be determined on its merits and not simply a matter of precedent, and I entirely agree. That is a perfectly fair comment, but I am not uncomfortable with having the essential decision made by the trial judge. The hon. Gentleman will also know that there are other precedents on which we can draw and that we must have regard to precedents in this area of the law—for instance, the Newton hearings are designed to determine the basis of a plea. We are on a slippery slope: if we adopt the approach advocated by the Liberal Democrats, we would soon find ourselves calling juries in to determine many matters that I believe are properly the province of the judge.
	I hope that the Liberal Democrats will understand that I will not be supporting them on this matter.

Douglas Hogg: My right hon. Friend is entirely right, and I should like to make two points in response to what he has said. I am sure he is correct to say that we should try to treat counter-terrorism legislation the same as legislation that covers other serious crime and that, to the extent that we properly can, we should adopt an exceptional process for it. On the other hand, the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) is right to say that we should be willing to bring the other issues of serious crime into line with counter-terrorism legislation, if the merits of the argument point in that direction. However, my feeling is that that is best left to the judge, and it is for that reason that I shall not follow the Liberal Democrats' advocacy on the matter.
	I want to make two other points, and the first has to do with forfeiture. The House will know that there are very extensive powers of forfeiture in both the 2000 Act and in clauses 33, 34 and 37 of this Bill. What standard of proof should the judge require before a forfeiture order is made?
	A forfeiture order is a draconian measure. It is appropriate in many cases, but we must make sure that a court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the relevant criteria set out in legislation are satisfied before such an order is made. In a bid to pre-empt an observation that the Minister may make, I should say that I believe such a requirement should in the Bill. It may be that the courts will have said in previous decisions that surety is a requirement, but we must say as much in legislation. The Minister will know that there was a case earlier this year in which the issue of aggravating circumstances in murder cases went to the Court of Appeal. That was the level at which it was decided that the judge involved had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt: that decision was needed because the existing legislation did not suffice in that respect.

Tony McNulty: But the substance of part 3 addresses precisely that point, and we think that it does so in an entirely satisfactory fashion—and so does the Scottish legal establishment, as the hon. Gentleman said, and most other parties in the House. I really do not think that his point is an issue of substance.
	On the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) made, I want to make it very clear that I am in no way amending the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007. I am not taking out that fourth limb, save in the context of clause 28 and the issues to do with jurisdiction. I have nothing but support for the Act, because it is a Government Act, but I am keenly aware that my hon. Friend has some difficulties with it. I just wanted to make that point clear. When I referred to Diplock, I was referring to the admonishments from my lawyers, who wanted me to stop calling it Diplock. That at least implies that I may have called it that before I was suitably admonished. I pass no comment on whether I was right or wrong.
	I am not entirely sure what is left to be dealt with, save the amendments of the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), which are important. I do not take them lightly. In the main, they are redundant and emphasise points that are already provided for in the Bill, but I can give a little hope to him: amendment No. 91 stands out from the array. I thank him for tabling it. The motivation behind it is clear, and he referred to it in Committee. He wishes to ensure that forfeiture of a convicted terrorist's assets does not lead to injustice and unwanted consequences for his innocent family. Clearly, the Government share that motivation, and we discussed the point in Committee. The sting in the tail, as ever, is that we are not entirely happy with the drafting as there may be issues to do with who counts as a dependant. The term is not fully defined. I assure the House that I will take the amendment away for careful consideration, and intend to come back with a revised amendment of our own, because I do not think that the amendment is otiose or redundant. Most of the other arguments that he makes are perfectly fair, but they reinforce points already set out in the Bill or in law.

Tony McNulty: I am not sure that that is the case. If we specified in the Bill that the judge must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, that could cast doubt not only on the burden of proof, but on the integrity of all other sentencing provisions. Our law is not littered with the phrase "beyond reasonable doubt". It operates in part by convention and in part by statute, and to isolate the forfeiture provisions and add "beyond reasonable doubt", which pertains anyway, could cast doubt on other sentencing provisions. Where there is doubt lies confusion, and where there is confusion, a pile of lawyers rush in and make a load of money out of it. That is not worth while, especially in such a sensitive area. It is well established that the test is being beyond reasonable doubt. My brief says, "Leave well alone". I shall not translate that into parliamentary language; the thrust is clear.
	I commend Government amendments Nos. 60 and 9, and I am grateful for the broadly generous way in which the House has received them, notwithstanding the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle. I urge the House to resist the other amendments in the group, save for my assurance that I will take amendment No. 91 away for consideration. It refers to an issue that the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham has usefully brought to the attention of the House.

Joan Humble: Is my hon. Friend aware that when Nicholas Blake produced a report given to the Government on the deaths at Deepcut barracks, he said that the families of the soldiers who had died should find their answers through the inquest system because the Government said that there should not be a public inquiry. Does my hon. Friend agree that under those provisions the families would never have found any answer to the deaths of their loved ones?

Andrew Dismore: The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. I agree.
	What is proposed in part 6 is no more and no less than a system of secret inquests for exactly the sort of cases that should be held in the open, where the state is potentially implicated. Independence is essential in such circumstances, and a Secretary of State-appointed coroner, even with the fig leaf of the Lord Chief Justice or other official would have no hope whatsoever of satisfying that independent test.

Jeremy Corbyn: I compliment my hon. Friend on his speech. In his capacity as Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, is he aware of any current procedure that allows an inquest to be held in camera, or allows denial of evidence to be made public, or anything remotely similar to that which we have at the present time? Does he know of any other European countries that adopt the same system that is being proposed in the Bill?

Andrew Dismore: On my hon. Friend's first question, public interest immunity certificates can be used, and I will refer to them shortly. I cannot help him with regard to the European experience but bearing in mind all the arguments that we have had on the Bill about international comparisons generally, I prefer not to go down that route. If he has such knowledge, I will be happy to hear from him.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman touched on an important point, which is the lack of clarity in respect of who the Secretary of State is. One might have expected that if this was a judicial process, it would be confined to the role of the Lord Chancellor, even though I agree with the hon. Gentleman that there are problems there because the Lord Chancellor is also the Secretary of State for Justice and in charge of prisons so there can be a conflict of interest. But the Bill, as it stands and even as amended by the Government's proposals, does not specify that it has to be the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice at all, which for me raises even greater anxiety about the fact that there seems to be a mixing of administrative and judicial process.

Andrew Dismore: The hon. and learned Gentleman is entirely right. That is why I gave two different examples. My understanding, based on what I have read and not on what is in the Bill, is that the list will be maintained by the Secretary of State for Justice. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right that it is not in the Bill, but it should be if we are to go down this route. I hope that it will not be because I hope that the House will agree to my amendments to take all this out. But if it is not the Secretary of State for Justice, one can only assume that it will be the Home Secretary and, in those circumstances a whole raft of other possible conflicts of interest and therefore lack of independence potentially arise.

Henry Bellingham: The hon. Gentleman mentioned public immunity certificates in his response to the intervention of the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn), but am I right in saying that rule 17 of the coroners' rules 1984 enable a coroner to direct that the public can be excluded from an inquest or any part of an inquest if he considers that it will be in the interests of national security to do so? If that is the case, what we are debating as part of the Bill is completely unnecessary and totally over the top.

Andrew Dismore: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. He is right, and it is a point that I intended to make later, but I am happy to have it made now.
	The next comparison to make here is with criminal cases. We have criminal cases prosecuted before a jury and we have criminal cases prosecuted before a judge—not a specially selected jury and not a specially selected judge; part of the ordinary criminal process. In those cases, the Secretary of State cannot pick and choose his jury and cannot pick and choose his judge, even if they are dealing with sensitive security matters. All the terrorist trials that we have seen in the last several years have been conducted through the ordinary criminal courts, so why do we need a separate process for something that is rather less than a criminal trial—the inquest system?
	We must remember that a criminal trial in a homicide case is, in effect, a substitute for the inquest anyway. An inquest will not normally follow a criminal prosecution for a homicide offence. The Minister may well say that in a criminal trial the prosecution always has the option not to proceed with a trial and it does not have that option in the inquest sphere, but I find it difficult to believe that we will find a case involving a terrorist that is not prosecuted because it is for the convenience of the Secretary of State to keep matters private.
	What sort of cases are we dealing with? The European Court has looked at some of these. In the Mubarek case, Lord Bingham summarised the purposes of an inquest as follows:
	"The purposes of such an investigation are clear: to ensure as far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death may save the lives of others."
	This process does not provide any of that. The point that I would particularly emphasise is that this is not a counsel of perfection. Lord Bingham summarises it quite accurately by saying
	"to ensure as far as possible".

Dominic Grieve: My understanding—it may be the hon. Gentleman's—is that the reason the Government suddenly came forward with these proposals was a problem encountered in one particular case, which interestingly enough is not terrorist related. Does he agree that the oddity is that the anxiety that the full facts should emerge in that one particular case, which is given as the justification for the change, seems in a way to be completely counterbalanced by the fact that even if the facts emerge correctly in that case and in the way that Government intend through this process, there will not be the transparency that will enable the verdict to be accepted?

Andrew Dismore: I take your constraints, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I simply say that the inquest is due to reopen later this year and that people can draw their own conclusions.
	It could, for example, apply to the Deepcut barracks case that was referred to earlier, or the death of the service people in Iraq, all potentially an embarrassment to the Government and the Ministry of Defence, as we have seen from some of the inquest verdicts so far. They are precisely the sort of cases that should not be subject to this process, which should have the transparency required by article 2 and not be swept into the secret inquest process being proposed by the Government through part 6.

Andrew Dismore: That is my next point. Amendments Nos. 1 to 3 would ditch this part of the Bill, and I hope that the Government accept them. If we were to review the process in its entirety, we could examine PII certificates, the exclusion of the public and the role of the coroner in excluding evidence—we could even consider security vetting juries. There is a series of other options that would enable an inquest to be held in public without going through the rigmarole of a secret inquest. The fact remains that the provision has nothing to do with terrorism; it concerns a secret system for investigating deaths that might be embarrassing for the Government, and that system cannot be allowed to stand. The measure is far too broad for inclusion in the Counter-Terrorism Bill, and it should wait for the publication of the coroners Bill. The situation will be difficult for the one family whose inquest has been stalled, but we should not legislate in haste to solve one case's problems. Let us be sensible and throw out the provision.

Adam Ingram: May I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to reflect on a point that relates to the Scottish element of this matter? This relates to national security and the way in which intercept and intelligence material could be presented to a particular court, in this case a coroner's court. The Bill is strangely silent on the parallel process in Scotland. There seem to be no provisions relating to the fatal accident inquiry in Scotland. I suppose that part of the reason for that rests with the minority Administration who now reside in Holyrood. They have ducked this issue as well and kicked their review of the fatal accident inquiry off into some time in the far distant future. That may add grist to the hon. and learned Gentleman's mill, but I ask him to take it on board.

Dominic Grieve: I very much take it on board. I hope that the Minister will provide an explanation of how the Government are approaching that. The situation is partly helped by the fact that Scotland has its own legal system, so mercifully, perhaps, we are not capable of interfering with it, or at least not interfering with it quite as radically as the Government might wish if they had the opportunity. This is a seriously flawed procedure.
	Moving on to the issue raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), the jury system exists in coroners cases to give public confidence, and it works well. I have done jury cases in coroners' courts, and in my experience juries are capable of taking in the evidence and giving verdicts that accord with the evidence. Indeed, the Diana, Princess of Wales inquest was a model of its kind. Although it was carried out in the most difficult circumstances, and was very costly, it appears to have commanded widespread public acceptance. A Lord Justice of Appeal was brought in because that expertise was required. All that was possible under the existing coroner system.
	What is the point of suddenly dispensing with juries? As the hon. Member for Hendon said, it is possible to have specially vetted juries, to have public interest immunity certificates, and to treat these processes as ordinary hearings. I very much agreed with his point about the requirement laid down by the European Court of Human Rights, which is highly relevant—that is, to do one's best in carrying out such inquiries, not to try to cross insurmountable obstacles. There is a considerable degree of understanding that there may be problems that make the evidence being presented to inquests inadmissible and one must do one's best, in a human and fallible world, to come up with the best answers.
	If we could get intercept evidence admitted in cases more generally, which we have frequently argued about, I have little doubt that we might start moving in the right direction on inquests just as on any other kind of trial. However, to try to create a short cut—with the best of motives, I am sure—is a mistaken road, and these proposals are not capable of being salvaged by anything that the Government can offer. We are expecting a coroners Bill. If we had a delay of a year while we went away and thought about what needs to be done and the Government came forward with other ideas and proposals in the context of their planned reforms to the coroner system generally, that would be a sensible approach. Legislating quickly and repenting at leisure is a big mistake.
	I will listen with great care to what the Minister says. I have no animosity towards the Government on this issue. I can see that they have a real problem, but the answer that they have come up with is profoundly and fundamentally wrong. This House has a major responsibility in upholding confidence in the law and the rule of law and in ensuring that deaths are properly investigated, particularly where there are issues of sensitivity surrounding possible state intervention, and it should not have anything to do with a set of proposals that will ultimately bring the Government into disrepute.

David Howarth: It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Blackpool, North and Fleetwood (Mrs. Humble), who made a number of very important points. On this issue, it is also a pleasure and honour to follow both the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) and the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), who made devastating cases against part 6, which manages to be simultaneously repugnant, unnecessary, ineffective and premature.
	Part 6 is repugnant because it violates the principle of the separation of the powers. It is unnecessary because the means for effecting most of its ends—public interest immunity and the power of the coroner—already exist to allow the public to be excluded on grounds of national security. It is ineffective because, as the hon. Members for Blackpool, North and Fleetwood and for Hendon and the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield have already demonstrated, this system will not bring about closure for the relatives who will not know the basis on which the decision has been made. From their point of view, the uncertainties will continue. It is premature because it is wrong to decide these issues before we know the full structure of the coronial system that the coroners Bill will set up and before we know the final resolution of the issue over the admissibility of intercept evidence in all forms of procedure.
	I accept what the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield said—that the origins of these clauses may not have been badly motivated. There is a case—we do not know the details, but we know the outline—for saying that there have been blockages because of how the present system works, but that does not justify where the Government have ended up because they have ended up with a system that grants extraordinary powers to the Secretaries of State.
	I also accept what the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield said about coroners being different and about the system being one of investigation rather than an adversarial conflict between two sides in court. That means that the state, in the form of the prosecution service, does not have the power to withdraw a case. Nevertheless, the issue of the relationship between the investigatory arm of the state in general and the Government is raised here.

David Howarth: It is extraordinarily dangerous. I know of only one other provision that allows the Government to interfere in some way—although this has been disputed—with an investigation in progress. This is the superintendence power of the Attorney-General over the director of the Serious Fraud Office in respect of its investigations, which was notoriously used in the BAE case. That is the only other example that I know of. These issues are up for grabs in the Constitutional Renewal Bill. Why the Government are bringing forward yet another example of something that even they admit in that Bill, which proposes reform, to be wrong seems to me quite extraordinary.
	The hon. Member for Hendon pointed out that only 2 per cent. of inquests end up before a jury, but that 2 per cent. is the crucial 2 per cent.—the 2 per cent. that consider deaths at the hands of agents of the state. At times in the debate, the Government's response to those of us who are deeply troubled by what they are doing has been to say that worrying about it reveals one to be a paranoid conspiracy theorist or an obsessive. It seems to me that that is not the case at all; it is perfectly reasonable to be worried— [Interruption.] The Minister chunters that no one said that, but when I read the Committee report, I thought that his treatment of the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) was of exactly that nature.
	It seems to me that we have examples before us that we should all worry about. The hon. Member for Hendon mentioned one of them, and we need to be careful about mentioning matters that are sub judice. It is clear, however, that mistakes are made by agents of the state—perhaps more than mistakes on occasion. There is always a temptation for the state to cover up its own mistakes.
	Much has been made of the crucial issue of public confidence. It is important that the public have confidence in the investigative system and public authorities, but more is at stake. The jury and the coronial system are a counterweight—a deterrent—to the temptation to abuse power in the first place. That is why the Government's proposal is fundamentally wrong.
	The Government's proposal is breathtaking in removing the jury from the case merely through a certificate of the Secretary of State—that point has been raised only peripherally so far, but is crucial to understanding why the proposal should be resisted. The basis of national security, relations with a foreign power and public interest is enormously broad—in particular, relations with a foreign power and being generally in the public interest seem to leave virtually nothing that could not be used to justify exclusion.

Mark Durkan: I am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) and to support amendment No. 1, along with amendments Nos. 2, 3 and 10.
	Clauses 65, 66, 67 and 69 are simply wrong; they are wrong in terms of the process that produced them, they are wrong in principle, and they will do wrong in practice. They are wrong in process because they came out of nowhere and were smuggled into a counter-terrorism Bill; the Government hoped to smuggle through these very controversial changes under the cover of the other controversies associated with the Bill that are more prominently featured in the media and elsewhere.
	The Government have told us all along that they wanted to create a consensus on counter-terrorism, and they went to some lengths to create all sorts of dialogues and discussions, although that did not particularly include the Northern Ireland parties, which I can understand in the prevailing circumstances. However, there was no consultation on the provisions before they appeared in the Bill, and since this matter was last discussed in the House there have, of course, been additions. Clause 66 will now extend some of the provisions on inquests to Northern Ireland, which was not previously the case. That clause 66 has been added to the Bill as an afterthought again shows how ad hoc the provisions are—it landed out of the blue in Committee.
	Public consultation is a legal duty in Northern Ireland. I hope that the Minister can clarify whether there was any consultation on this measure. Was there consultation with any of the Northern Ireland parties? Was there consultation with the Assembly? Will there be? Has there been consultation even with the Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister?
	These sensitive proposed changes might give rise to a number of serious implications and complications regarding the devolution of justice and policing. Let me ask a simple question: to whom would the proposed powers be devolved in the event of the devolution of justice and policing—or will the Government insist that they should still reserve the powers to themselves on the grounds of national security and relations with other Governments? If that is the Government's view, it is a serious issue. Northern Ireland Office Ministers have been telling this House how wonderful agreements and consensus have been reached in the Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly that was looking at issues to do with the devolution of justice and policing, and at the detail of the exact scope of the powers to be devolved and how they might be devolved. Yet the Government have now—wham, bam—thrown in this grenade, in circumstances in which the Prime Minister has personally been involved in talks including the new First Minister and Deputy First Minister to try to resolve some of the difficulties in the devolution of justice and policing.
	I hope that the Minister can provide some explanation or clarification, and if there has not been proper consultation or consideration I ask the Government to think about using that as at least one of the grounds on which they might consider withdrawing some or all of the clauses to allow for wider developments and for wider and proper discussions of all these issues later in the context of the coroners Bill. Those discussions would then take place with our knowing about the issues raised for Scotland and Northern Ireland, and we could address all the other fundamental points that Members have been expressing in this debate.
	Why this scramble? Why do that rather than await the coroners Bill, which the Prime Minister promised us when he made the statement on the legislative programme only a matter of days ago? If that new process introduced by the Prime Minister is to mean anything, we should properly respect that promised Bill and all eyes and all work should be focused on it, rather than try to piggyback in a grotesque way fundamental issues to do with coroners' courts into a counter-terrorism Bill, when the powers in respect of coroners' courts in the Bill are not restricted or confined to what could be defined as terrorist cases. Other hon. Members have made the point that these powers, which would apply UK-wide, could apply in cases of custodial death, military death or death in circumstances of pursuit or controversy, and in all sorts of health and safety cases where issues of negligence or malice might well arise, or be felt or suspected. Inquests are about affording families and the wider public a sense of truth and at least some basis of understanding. We cannot simply pat victims on the shoulder and then shrug our shoulders when it comes to their need for truth, understanding and a sense of justice, yet that is what we are getting in the Bill.
	The breadth of the powers in the clauses is striking. The Secretary of State will be able to remove a jury and a sitting coroner on almost limitless grounds—national security; relations with any other Government, no matter how bad their repute; and the public interest—to be defined at the whim and with the private knowledge of Ministers, but to be undisclosed and unexplained to the public, as ever. In short, the discretion is unlimited and untrammelled. The Secretary of State will have the power to sack juries and coroners if and when he likes. It is the Secretary of State who will have that power, not a judge, who makes a decision after hearing submissions from parties. A politician will control what this special area of the judicial branch of the state is to do. So much for the independence of the judiciary.
	It is not just any politician who will have this power, but one who will too often have a conflict of interest, as other hon. Members have said. Juries are required in inquests when there may have been wrongdoing or negligence on the part of the state, yet who will get to decide whether there is to be a jury? Who will get to decide whether to step in and put a stop to a certain coroner and jury if they do not like the way in which an inquest is going? Who will get to decide whether to appoint a select special coroner of their own? The answer is the Secretary of State, and that is a fairly breathtaking reach on the part of any Executive.

Mark Durkan: The hon. Gentleman reinforces the point that a number of hon. Members have made. The state might have issues to cover up or its own interests or those of its agents to protect, and it is in a position to do so. It is even in a position to protect the agents of another state, no matter how unworthy that other state might be. That is the kind of law that this Parliament is being asked to approve tonight. The Secretary of State will not only be able to sack the sitting district coroner and the jury and take an inquest off them; if he so wishes, he will be able to sack the special coroner and then appoint another one. That is how far the Government have gone on this issue.
	I am not sure that I could fully agree with the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield that this is just some messy lay-by that the Government have stumbled into. They seem to be going some distance with these proposals; they have worked their way around the board, passed "Go" and collected £200. I find it hard to believe that the Government have got lost here. They have ended up somewhere where they get all the control and hold all the cards when it comes to inquests. How real is the supposed veto that the Lord Chief Justice would have? That is a cosmetic move by the Government, because it would be almost impossible for the Lord Chief Justice to exercise the veto without causing huge controversy and difficulty. In reality, the Secretary of State will get to choose whom he or she wants.
	Yet again, we witness the right to a jury being stripped away. The Minister earlier stressed that the non-jury courts in Northern Ireland will no longer be Diplock courts, because they will have a different legislative basis, However, clause 66 means that we will not only have continuity Diplock courts, but Diplock inquests, in which juries will be prohibited on the say-so of the Secretary of State in cases in which they would otherwise be involved. Juries could even be, in effect, sacked.
	What message does that send to the families whose loved ones' deaths are the subjects of the inquests? What message does it send out to jurors, who are responsible, law-abiding citizens who are prepared to play their role and do their civic duty on a jury? How would they feel if, for reasons unexplained, they were suddenly sacked and disposed of? It would be a scandal if that were to happen in any case, but we are told that this is a matter of administrative convenience and could be done for diplomatic comfort, for the sake of relations with other countries. It will certainly be for the convenience of those who have something to hide or who want to hide something for others.
	If the Secretary of State is going to go so far as to remove the jury and if we have measures to control the business of inquests in terms of secrecy, is it too far fetched to worry that the next step will be to exclude the press and families, or even everyone? That is the dangerous logic of where this is headed, and that is why the Government need to put a halt to it now and leave such matters to the anticipated coroners Bill. It is entirely wrong that we face the prospect of the Secretary of State acting as the puppet master in inquests in which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) pointed out, the state may have much to hide. In some cases, the state may have little to hide but will still go to these offensive lengths to hide it. That must not and should not be done.
	Inquests must meet certain standards, as Jordan  v. UK, Edwards  v. UK and other cases that have been taken to Europe have made clear. The first standard is that they should be independent, both institutionally and in practice. How does that standard sit with one side in the proceedings having the power to sack the jury and choose the coroner; to sack that coroner and choose another one; and to control what happens with secrecy?
	Inquests must also be capable of leading to a determination of responsibility and the punishment of those responsible, yet in Northern Ireland there is no possibility of bringing a verdict of unlawful killing. Another standard is that inquests must be prompt, yet there are cases in Northern Ireland in which inquests into murders in the 1980s—there is even one in the 1970s—still have not happened. We still have 20 inquests outstanding involving 30 deaths from the troubles.
	Inquests are meant to allow for sufficient public scrutiny to ensure accountability. With the jury sacked and, I have no doubt, with other powers and restrictions to come, that is clearly on the wane. Of course, inquests must allow the next of kin to participate, yet that too is under threat from the direction of travel that the Government are taking. Hon. Members should be in no doubt that these powers will be not only used, but abused.
	Let me give an example of a case in Northern Ireland. Roseanne Mallon, a 76-year-old woman, was shot dead by loyalists in 1994. Her sister was shot, too, and she took a civil action against the Ministry of Defence. In the context of that action, by some miracle, she discovered tapes held by the Army that revealed that her house was under observation by members of the Special Air Service—the SAS. They saw the loyalists arrive at the house and saw what was happening. In fairness, they radioed back to Mahon barracks to say what they had seen and to ask for instructions. Mahon barracks told them to do nothing and that was that.
	That information came up during a civil action, but in context of the inquest the coroner asked for a copy of the tape from the MOD, which flatly refused to provide it, God alone knows for what reason. Maybe it is for reasons of national security or the public interest, but whatever the MOD's grounds for holding that clear evidence, which is relevant to an inquest, they will be able to use those same grounds to sack a jury and to dispose of the inquest, too. So that inquest still has not happened. Neither have inquests in the shoot-to-kill cases from the early '80s, nor those in the cases from the late '90s of Raymond McCord and Sean Brown. Such a situation leaves families wondering whether inquests are being stalled until one generation of the family dies off. It leaves them feeling that the state feels that time is on its side and that it can play it as long as it takes—and, of course, as the families say, the new measures are then brought forward.
	In Northern Ireland, there is a consultative group looking at issues of the past appointed by the British Government and led by Lord Eames and Denis Bradley. The Bill's provisions leave a lot of people with the sense that some of the unresolved cases that have not been the subject of inquests will be crudely disposed of using the new powers. People such as me will not be in a position to disarm people of that suspicion unless the Government move to halt the measure now. Families are left without loved ones, suffocating with frustration that they cannot get truth or understanding about their situation. Rather than meeting their situation with truth and justice, the Government are creating more obstruction and more obfuscation.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North asked my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) whether there were such powers in other parts of the world. My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon rightly resisted going on a comparative world tour of such matters. I draw the attention of the House to a fact about the clauses that we are discussing tonight, which concern not only Northern Ireland but the whole of the UK—or certainly England and Wales, at least. They are uncannily similar to a legislative provision made in another Parliament, which allowed the Minister to provide
	"for the duties of a coroner and a coroner's jury, or of either of them, as respects any inquest prohibited by the order being performed by such officer or court as may be determined by the order".
	The order was entirely in the control of the Minister, and that provision was in the notorious Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922.
	This year, we are celebrating the 40th anniversary of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. Its work and cause were supported by many Members of this House, and one of its aims—and eventual successes—was to overturn that obnoxious legislation. We need to remember how notorious the 1922 Act was. South Africa's Minister for Justice in the apartheid years, Mr. Vorster, put through his own pernicious legislation, but said that he would trade it all for one clause of the 1922 Act.
	Now we find that, with this Bill, this Government are digitally remastering one of the most pernicious and obnoxious provisions of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922. That is what we have come to, and that is what is happening with the provisions in the clauses under consideration. They are almost uncanny in their resemblance to the 1922 Act when it comes to their scope and their effect.
	If nothing else, what should give people cause for concern is that the measures will not be applied only to Northern Ireland. Indeed, Northern Ireland is in some ways protected from some of them, as the special coroners will not operate there. As I understand it, that is because it is deemed that all Northern Ireland's coroners are already kosher, having been security vetted and all the rest of it. However, the standard set by the 1922 Act is to be the law for England, Wales and Northern Ireland in the future.
	The House needs to think twice about these provisions, and I beg the Government to think again about them. Ministers may claim that they apply in only a small number of cases, but it has been stressed already that those cases will be very important and controversial. Moreover, if the number of cases is likely to be small, and if the powers are to be used only rarely and as such are not worth worrying about, why are we to have 15 special coroners? Why are the Government going to such lengths, without consultation and when other legislation is going to be available soon? If they are trying to clarify, reform and deal with problems with the coroner's system in an effective and positive way, appropriate legislation is already coming.
	The Government should withdraw these provisions from the Bill. If they do not do so, Parliament should say no to them.

Dai Havard: I knew I would get it wrong. My right hon. Friend was the Chair of the Defence Committee when we produced the report, "Duty of Care". That is an interesting phrase; it refers to our duty of care to people—the families—who have an interest in an inquest and go through the process. I am very interested in the subject.
	In some senses, the part of the Bill that we are discussing worries me more than the issue of pre-charge detention. It is interesting that the media have not really done much with it, and that there has not been much informed debate among the public about the real effects of the provision that we are discussing.
	It was clear both during our inquiry and subsequently that the inquest process has huge potential to allow people to understand not only what has happened, but why. The provision will deny that process to people who would be subject to it. We saw the genuine pain and suffering of families who wanted that ability to understand—they did not necessarily want revenge or retribution—but to whom the process was denied, because it was not properly run and not properly available to them.
	A coroners' Bill is due to be introduced. The Defence Committee is waiting for it, and had a discussion today. I do not speak on behalf of the Committee, but as everyone will know, we wish to hold an inquiry on how the coroners' process is run, with regard to cases concerning the death of military personnel and attendant effects relating to people associated with the military. The provision that we are discussing seems inherently unsound, in a way that many hon. Members have already described. Certainly, its timing is wrong. When that Bill comes along, the provision in the Counter-Terrorism Bill and this discussion will not inform it. They will prejudice it if the Bill proceeds and the Government will have to unscramble it and redo it.
	The dangers of the provision have been described by others. As the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) said, the problem is not what such provisions do now, but what happens later. I suppose the Secretary of State responsible will be the Justice Secretary. That might be an honourable person at present, but individuals will change. We must be careful what we do. I signed the amendment and I shall prosecute that if necessary, but I would prefer not to do so.
	Everyone has explained that this is the wrong time to legislate in haste in a Bill that, we are told, was drawn up in the cold light of day as a reserve power for the future. The provision is wrong, it is dangerous, and I hope that the Minister will withdraw it—if not here, then elsewhere later.

Richard Shepherd: In a civilised society, every one of us, and the society itself, has an interest in the causes of the death of every one of its members. That point has been well rehearsed in the debate. The Bill is extraordinary, but I say to the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) that I am not surprised by anything that the Government bring forward from the Home Office or any of their security agencies to improve the lot of the British citizen.
	Who could imagine that a Bill about terrorism should suddenly incorporate an amendment of a Coroners Act to bring about a situation that repudiates the whole tradition of our open justice and our approach to the reinforcement of the citizen's right to know what happened in the circumstances of an unusual or exceptional death? That is why we support coroners courts. That is why they have been largely open and accessible to us. We spoke about closure and satisfaction of the individual families concerned, but we as a society have a wider interest. We want to know that the cause of death is explicable and whether it was criminal in its intent.
	Suddenly a Bill relating to terrorism contains an extraordinary and very nasty series of proposals. It states:
	"The Secretary of State may certify in relation to an inquest that, in the opinion of the Secretary of state, the inquest will involve the consideration of material that should not be made public",
	and then it lists the circumstances:
	"in the interests of national security,
	in the interests of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, or"—
	the usual catch-all that the Government use—
	"otherwise in the public interest."
	Defining the public interest is a matter not only for Government, but for the Chamber. It strikes at the basis of our principles. It is outrageous that it has been incorporated in the Bill.
	The provision can be retrospective. The clause goes on:
	"Where a certificate has effect in relation to an inquest, the inquest must be held or (as the case may be) continued without a jury"
	and so on. It is an assertion of the nervousness of the state. Let us be clear about that. Who in a democratic society would seek such far-reaching power to obscure something that we take as a routine part of our democratic exchanges? Yet there has been no justification. What do the Government mean by
	"in the interests of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, or otherwise in the public interest"?
	It is everything, is it not? The Government determine it. On the most basic and preliminary examination, this is unacceptable.
	I have heard all the calls for national security over the nearly 30 years that I have been in the House. The Conservative Government used to bait the Labour party because it opposed internment and the Northern Ireland terrorism Acts. This Government now try to bait the Conservative party on the basis that we are soft on terrorism. It is nonsense. This country is united in the belief that we want peaceful, lawful existence, and that the purposes of the state are to ensure that each and every one of us is secure. To stick in the middle of that the view that something nasty might be going on in a coroner's court hardly brings joy to the hearts of a free people when they listen to a Government bring forward what we all know are important measures in other areas of the Bill. I hope very much that the House—no one else has spoken in favour of it other than the Minister himself—

Jeremy Corbyn: I shall be brief to enable the Minister to reply and other Members to speak. I want the Minister to be able to explain to the House exactly why we are introducing something as draconian as clause 65 into this Bill. I am glad that we have had a good debate on this issue this evening, because this part of the Bill is as important and as dangerous to liberties in this country as the 42 days that we will be debating tomorrow. Like that issue, it crosses the important Rubicon of the separation of political and judicial powers. If we are to give the Secretary of State the power to appoint a coroner, the power to prevent a jury and the power to intervene in a case as it goes on, we can no longer claim that there is a complete separation of political and judicial authority in this country. Additionally, since, as far as I understand it, the majority, if not all, of jury cases that are heard in a coroner's court involve a state party—be it the police, the Army or some other organ of the state—in a death, the Minister, whoever he is, will have a clear conflict of interest, as many hon. Members have pointed out.
	Proposed new section 8A(1) (b) in clause 65 (2) contains the words
	"in the interests of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country".
	That particularly disturbs me. If we are to be proud of and believe in our judicial system and traditions, why are we saying that our relationships with another jurisdiction are an overriding interest? Look at the odium that Tony Blair incurred when he intervened to prevent the investigation by the Serious Fraud Office into the involvement of BAE Systems with Saudi Arabia. He said in his defence that the overriding interest was one of national security and the relationship with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, whose record on human rights is slightly questionable in a number of areas. I suspect that the overriding interest would relate to many other jurisdictions as well where we have close relationships, arms sales or whatever else. It is simply wrong and dangerous for us to do this. It will not do our standing any good around the world and it is no good for our judicial system or our democracy.
	I also draw attention to the briefing that has been sent out by Inquest. That organisation has its offices in my constituency and it has campaigned with great difficulty and tenacity and very bravely on investigating the causes of deaths in custody. I pay tribute to that organisation, and I know the people who work there very well.
	I know families where somebody has died in custody, and the family goes through the pain of calling for an inquiry, a coroner's court inquest and so on. Someone who dies in custody may be under suspicion, which may be why they are in custody in the first place. Such people often do not have wonderful connections with brilliant barristers and lawyers, and they are often victims who find themselves in police custody and tragically die for a variety of reasons. In such circumstances, it is not in the interests of the police to ensure that there is an open investigation, and it is not necessarily in the interests of any other agency of the state. The only avenue that is available for families of the deceased to seek justice is through the legal system. If we give the Secretary of State the power to intervene to prevent a jury trial in a coroner's court, that avenue will not be open to such families.
	I have two more points. First, deaths in custody raise important issues of state power and accountability. In a free and democratic society, deaths in state custody should be subject to particularly close public scrutiny. For that reason, it is imperative that the inquest system is open and transparent so that justice can be seen to be done and public confidence in the state bodies is upheld.
	Secondly, I intervened on my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) during his excellent contribution—I will take great pleasure in supporting his amendment—on international comparisons. I do not have the information that he thought that I had about what happens in every other jurisdiction, but I want to discuss article 2 of the European convention on human rights, which other hon. Members have also mentioned. Article 2 requires the Government to implement a proper procedure for ensuring the accountability of agents of the state to maintain public confidence and to allay any concern arising from the use of lethal force. It places a positive duty on the state to investigate a death in custody with an inquiry that is conducted on the state's own initiative, that is independent both institutionally and in practice, that is capable of leading to a determination of responsibility and the punishment of those responsible, that is prompt, that allows for sufficient public scrutiny and that enables the next of kin to participate.
	When the Minister replies, I hope that he will explain the motives behind the inclusion of clause 65 and its related provisions in the Bill. We are taking a very dangerous step: we are giving too much unaccountable power to Ministers to protect the state's agents, when the public rely on us, as Members of Parliament, to defend their interests, their procedures and their access to justice.

Tony McNulty: I am sorry to prevent others from contributing, but I am mindful of the time.  [ Interruption. ] The programme motion was agreed by Government and Opposition Front Benchers, so take it up with them and get real.
	Some germane and relevant issues have been raised. There have been some interesting little treatises, including the previous contribution by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn), but they do not bear much relation to the substance of the Bill. Nobody, apart from my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, North and Fleetwood (Mrs. Humble), has answered the question of what to do about families who are currently stuck in limbo and cannot achieve resolution and closure at an inquest into the death of a loved one because of the blockage around the use of sensitive material and, potentially, intercept evidence—I will address the point raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) in a moment. If this system, or a similar system, does not prevail, what will happen to families involved in such rare cases? The answer is that they will stay in limbo; the answer is that they will stay in abeyance and nothing will be done for them.

Tony McNulty: I accept that, and I applaud the implementation team on its work, as I do the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues who were on the original Chilcot committee. It relates to the point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe, too. These are absolutely and quintessentially different circumstances. The right hon. Gentleman will know, because he has lived and breathed it for the best part of a year or more, that the whole edifice and architecture of Chilcot, and how to move to utilise intercept as evidence in courts, is precisely as a result of the two substantive sides—precisely because of disclosure and all the other elements that surround it. They are not germane to an individual coroner sitting in such circumstances.
	The right hon. Gentleman's constituency is very close to Scotland—I hope his town stays this side of the border; I have heard the rumours—and he will know that a High Court judge is quite properly on the appropriate list in Scotland to get such sensitive material, including intercept, as evidence during fatal accident inquiries. That is why FAIs do not feature in the provisions. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Mr. Ingram) asked a question about that, and he will know that Lord Cullen of Whitekirk was recently appointed—in March, I think—to carry out a full review of the law and the operation of FAIs in Scotland. He will consider issues relating to article 2 and the disclosure of sensitive materials during the course of that review, which, I am told, is to report by next March.

John Reid: I have no wish to add to my right hon. Friend's burden of explaining some of the contradictions in the concessions that have been made to get the Bill through, but because I agree with the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith), let me ask the Minister this simple question. The Bill establishes a principle of extending the use of intercept evidence in a coroner's court. Why is it necessary to do so in this Bill, here and now, when our own inquiry is under way and will report in the not too distant future, and when we are awaiting the Bill on the coroners' process? Why is it not possible here to wait, but in Scotland—another part of the United Kingdom—it is possible, on a matter of national security, to wait until its inquiry has resulted, and when, moreover, responsibility for national security on such an issue will be handed over from this House to the First Minister in Scotland?

Tony McNulty: That is because, as my right hon. Friend knows, the High Court judge rather than the coroner sits in FAIs and already has the capability under Scottish law to receive and use that information. I freely concede the point, although not in respect of the constitutional drivel from the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth), that two or three things are going on that of course should, more usefully, be aligned. In the wake of the Jordan case and what we require on article 2—yes, again, for the families and nobody else—we cannot delay one particular case any longer. There may well be others, as I have suggested. It would simply be unfair and unjust on those family members and on that case.
	I alluded to this point in Committee and I am happy to repeat it that I shall do all that I can to ensure—I do not know what the mechanism is; we are still exploring it—that these elements are duly sunsetted and fed into the coroners reform Bill. That is where they properly belong and can be properly fed into all the other aspects of a full and deep review of the coronial system in the country. That is right. The balance for us to strike is to comply now with article 2 and the essence of the Jordan case and to move on further the individual case and, potentially, other individual cases, because they have been held in abeyance for so long, rather than to wait not only for the Chilcot implementation group and Lord Cullen to report, but for what may well be—I do not know; I am not a futurologist—the real rather than the apparent existence of a coroners reform Bill, from the pre-legislative form in the Queen's Speech to actuality.

Dominic Grieve: May I just pick up on that point? The Minister's argument is that the provision is vital for a number of cases in which people need justice, but how does he respond to the point that has been made from all parts of the House that the system is so inherently flawed that it will not deliver the results that the Government claim of it? This is a matter of self-interest, if I may say so to the Minister. The Government should pause and withdraw these measures, because they will not fulfil the expectations that they themselves have placed in them, apart from the fact that they are unfair.

Tony McNulty: With respect, no, given the time that I have and the hon. Gentleman's contribution.

Andrew Dismore: We have had an interesting debate, and there has been unanimity across the House—apart from my right hon. Friend the Minister—that the proposals should not stand. The fact remains that the proposals create a system of secret inquests. No matter how much my right hon. Friend blusters about it, that is the case. He asked the question, "What about families?" We are aware of only one family affected. It is a serious matter for that family, as I mentioned earlier. My right hon. Friend talks about closure, but the process in question will not give them closure. It might give them partial closure and some of the answers, but it will not give them the full story. We have not heard whether the Government have considered the public interest immunity system in that case. We do not know whether the family in question have asked for that process to be implemented. Has it been discussed with them, and would they accept it if it was offered to them?
	My right hon. Friend says that none of us is really interested in the concerns of the families. I can tell him that in my professional life I have dealt with many bereaved families—cases where people were killed in the most appalling circumstances at work or on the roads—and I know what makes families in those circumstances tick. Inquests deal with bereaved families day in, day out, and those involved are opposed to the proposals. If I were to ask the families concerned whether they wanted to wait a little longer and have a much better chance of getting full closure, or whether they wanted the process to go forward now and not know what actually happened, I know which alternative they would accept.
	The inquest process is not just about the families. They are an important part of the process, but there is also a public accountability function. There is a public interest function in establishing the truth, and the provisions will prevent that from happening. We are not looking for a counsel of perfection in an inquest. Inquest verdicts are not brought in on the basis of "beyond all reasonable doubt", considering every factor involved.
	The question of why we are doing this now arises, when many other things are yet to be decided. A coroners Bill is coming up. Why are we tacking the provision into a terrorism Bill when most of the cases we are talking about will not involve terrorism at all? We are told about a sunset clause. Can we have a sunset clause just for this case, covering a few weeks, then kill the Bill off after that? We still have not heard which Secretary of State will be involved, and the separation of powers argument has been advanced by several Members. My right hon. Friend accepts that the provision would be better in the coroners Bill—let us go down that route. The fact remains that the process in the Bill forms no real part of our system and it ought not to be allowed to survive.
	 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
	 The House proceeded to a Division.

Helen Jones: It is normal to begin an Adjournment debate by saying that one is grateful to have it, but in this case I am rather disappointed to have had to apply for the debate at all. The organisation of the local elections in Warrington this year revealed both an astonishing degree of incompetence on the part of the acting returning officer, Mrs. Terris, and a disregard for the basic principles of democracy that was frankly breathtaking. It also revealed some gaps in our system for ensuring that returning officers deliver a proper degree of service to the electors and for holding them to account when they do not.
	This is not a party political matter. All parties in this House are committed to the principles of democracy and we all want the highest possible participation in elections. I have been involved in elections now for more than 30 years, under councils of all different political complexions and a wide variety of returning officers, and I have never had cause to complain about any of them. However, I believe that the shambles that we saw in Warrington in these local elections needs to be properly investigated and we need to take steps to ensure that it does not happen again.
	Our problems began even before the elections were called, when the council conducted a review of polling stations. It did not consult political parties through their elected officers. It appears from conversations that have taken place since with candidates, agents and the deputy returning officer that the only people whom the council consulted were elected councillors. I find it astonishing that anyone could believe that only those people who have already been elected should determine the sites of polling stations but, together with the fact that the council's website showed the polling stations still in their original positions, that meant that many candidates and agents did not discover that there had been changes until the election campaign was under way.
	Some of those changes caused real problems. For example, one polling station in the Orford ward was moved from Beamont primary school to St. Benedict's, which meant a much longer journey for many people. In the Culcheth, Glazebury and Croft ward there were severe problems, in that the polling station for the Newchurch area was supposed to be moved right to the end of that area, meaning a long walk down a long road for many voters. The polling station in Mee Brow, which is traditionally an area of low turnout, was to disappear altogether and people were expected to trek more than a mile up a very busy road to the village of Glazebury.
	All of that ignored the advice of the Electoral Commission, which makes it clear that a building used as a polling station
	"needs to be close to where voters live".
	It also gives serious advice about looking at the public transport structure in an area, but that was clearly not done in Mee Brow, where the level of car ownership is lower than average.
	The site proposed for the Newchurch polling station would have been accessible only by going past the Tory candidate's house, which he was perfectly entitled to plaster with posters. I am not making a party political point, as that would be wrong whichever party was involved. However, as people raised these problems it became apparent that the returning officer and her deputy had no idea where the polling stations had been, and no idea of the areas to which they were being moved. Again, that is contrary to the advice of the Electoral Commission, which states that it is
	"vital to think about the demography of your own area and the access needs of voters."
	Clearly, that was not done in the two instances that I have given, which happened in areas with a higher proportion of elderly people than normal. It was also interesting that one of the suggestions for putting matters right was to move the Newchurch polling station to a pub car park—an idea that will always encourage people to vote in the evenings and late at night.
	The problem was eventually resolved, with polling stations returning to their original locations, but we have still received no explanation of why the consultation was not conducted properly in the first place. Indeed, I think that the returning officer's interest in the elections can be judged by the fact that she went on holiday during the nomination period. I am well aware that she is legally entitled to devolve her responsibilities to someone else, but I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to look seriously at the relevant legislation. It seems ludicrous that the person with the legal responsibility for running an election can be away for part of the process. It is not as though we did not know when the elections were going to take place, as they were always going to be on 1 May. There was nothing unexpected about that.
	However, as the election progressed, it became apparent that there were other problems. Many people did not receive their polling cards, and I again quote the Electoral Commission, which states:
	"Poll cards are one of the most important means of communication with electors. In some cases, electors may be unaware than an election is actually taking place until they receive a poll card."
	Significant numbers of voters in Warrington did not receive their poll cards, and the problems were especially acute in the ward of Culcheth, Glazebury and Croft, as well as in Penketh and Cuerdley, which is in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington, South (Helen Southworth). In Culcheth, one of the candidates became aware of the problem the day before the election and attempted to contact the returning officer or her deputy. He left his mobile telephone number, and the number of the constituency office, but he did not get a call back until lunchtime on election day. His call was returned by the council's communications officer, but picked up by someone else. The officer's reason for not ringing until then was that she had been very busy setting up the media centre for the elections. Apparently, council officers believe that that is more important than ensuring that people know of their right to vote.
	The answer that we were given at that stage was that council officers would leaflet part of the ward to tell people of their right to vote. However, two polling districts were not to be leafleted, even though it was pointed out that there were problems there. In fact, it now appears that council officers had known about those problems for a week but had taken no steps to find out whether other parts of the ward were affected.
	In Penketh, canvassers discovered that there was a problem in a particular polling district over the weekend before the election. They notified the deputy returning officer on Monday 28 April. A request that the returning officer should write to all affected voters and ensure that they were aware of their right to vote was refused, and A5 flyers were delivered instead. They were flimsy things, delivered after people had gone to work and easily confused with junk mail. In Penketh, some of them were delivered outside the area affected, meaning that some people turned up at the wrong polling station and had to be turned away.
	That selective leafleting and the failure to deal with the problems has led to the returning officer being accused of bias. I genuinely regret that, but she and her staff left themselves open to that kind of accusation by not taking the problems seriously. It was quite wrong for the communications officer to respond as she did when someone told her, "People haven't got their polling cards." She responded—I heard her say it—"Some people have got their polling cards." In some countries, there may be a career for people who take that view of elections, but that is not how we run a democracy in Britain.
	There were also problems with the postal vote, with a number of people receiving their postal votes only the day before the election. The Electoral Commission makes it clear that although there is no last date for distributing postal votes:
	"Clearly the earlier they are distributed, the more opportunity electors have to complete and return their postal vote."
	Some people did not receive their postal votes at all; there are a number of such cases in the Poplars and Hulme ward. When the problem was reported, officers blamed Royal Mail. At that stage, it did not matter whose fault it was; what mattered was whether they tried to put things right. People who had not received their postal votes were told to turn up at the town hall with identification, where another one would be issued. That quite ignores the fact that many people with postal votes are elderly or disabled. If they could get to the town hall, they would not need a postal vote in the first place. A returning officer has the power to correct procedural errors, and there is provision for ballot papers to be delivered by hand, so one has to ask why nobody tried to visit some of the people affected, check their identity and deliver their ballot paper.
	I heard a candidate report that there was no disabled access at some polling stations, and the same cavalier attitude was taken. He was told, "We haven't got enough ramps." I do not know whether those involved believe that the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 does not apply in Warrington, but the Electoral Commission believes that it does. It said:
	"It is our view that Returning Officers must not discriminate against disabled people by providing a worse service to a disabled person than they would to a non-disabled person."
	The problems were compounded by people not being able to get hold of the returning officer or her deputy on election day. In my experience, that is unprecedented. I have always been able to get hold of a returning officer, and if any problem occurred, it could be put right then and there. Instead, candidates and agents were told that the returning officer and her deputy were out visiting polling stations. Apparently they did that all day, and unlike the rest of the population they do not have mobile phones. That in itself raises questions: if two senior officers were visiting polling stations all day, why did they not notice that there was no disabled access at some polling stations, that people were turning up at the wrong polling station, and that in one polling station votes for two wards were being put in the same ballot box?
	I now turn to the problems at the count, which were reported to me by the candidates and agents. It is generally agreed by everyone to whom I have spoken that there was far too much noise at the count, both from the counters and people around the count, and that the returning officer did very little to stop it. Noise distracts counters and is not the sign of a well-conducted count. Indeed, at one point, a candidate—not from my party—had to call for silence so that the results could be heard. Again, nothing was done.
	As I say, the votes for two wards—one was Poulton South, and the other was Fairfield and Howley—were put in the same ballot box at one polling station. They were checked and verified at the beginning of the count and separated out, but by the time the Poulton South count finished, officers had clearly forgotten about that. They could not make the figures tally and had to recount three times before they remembered that other votes had been in the same box. I do not know how they eventually verified the totals, because I presume that the Fairfield and Howley votes had already been put in with the other votes for that ward.
	It was also the case that bundles of 25 votes were secured with flimsy paper clips and frequently fell apart, and that the bundles of 100, instead of being tied with coloured bands, as is normal, were held together with ordinary plastic bands. That made it much easier to confuse the votes, and in one case 100 votes for one candidate were wrongly allocated to another. On another occasion, a bundle was found to contain 125 votes instead of 120.
	At the end of the Poulton South count, the candidate was told—it was the successful candidate, as it happens—that his result was to be announced. He said, "Not until you have told me the figures." The officer refused to tell him and he had an argument with the officer before the candidates were given the figures. Not giving candidates the figures removes their right to ask for a recount before the result is announced and is a serious matter.
	Although these issues were picked up, it is clear that others were not. In the parish wards being counted on the same night, for instance, candidates and agents were not shown the spoiled ballot papers, meaning that the requirement to adjudicate spoiled papers with the candidates and agents present was ignored, and the provision for agents to object to the inclusion of any vote could not be carried out. At least two parish wards were counted in the middle of the room, away from the counting agents, and candidates and agents were not notified that the counts were taking place. In one case, the first they knew about that was when the deputy returning officer arrived with the ballot papers bundled. In another case, they found out only when the result was announced.
	I have seen some of the letters that the returning officer has written in response to complaints. Her view seems to be, "Unless you're taking an election petition against me, it doesn't matter." She said to one candidate who complained about not seeing the count, "It did not affect the result." That will not do. In this country we count the votes where people can see them. My hon. Friend knows as well as I do that it is easy for votes to be put on the wrong pile or for a bundle to be allocated to the wrong candidate. That happened in district wards and was picked up by the counting agents. Neither the returning officer nor anyone else can have an assurance that that did not happen in counts where people did not watch the count.
	The returning officer describes these shortcomings as oversights. They are not oversights. They reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the way that elections ought to be run. The difficulty is that, short of a police investigation and a court case, we do not seem to have a system for holding returning officers to account. The Electoral Commission was given power in the Electoral Administration Act 2006 to draw up performance standards. It will not begin even to consult on them until this autumn.
	That is not good enough. Democracy should not depend on where one lives. People's access to voting should not be a matter of chance; it is a matter of right. I urge my hon. Friend to investigate these matters to ensure that a proper review is carried out, if possible by an experienced returning officer from another area, and to make sure that such things do not happen in my constituency or anywhere else in the future.

Bridget Prentice: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington, North (Helen Jones) on securing the debate. She said she was rather disappointed that she had to bring the issue to the House, but if even half of what she described turns out to be true, it is important that the House has been able to hear and consider it. She brought the matter to the House with her usual eloquence, passion and panache.
	My hon. Friend has raised an important issue. Her concerns relate to the administration of elections in her constituency, although they have a wider resonance for the rest of us across the country. The effective delivery of an election goes to the heart of and underpins our healthy democracy—the principles of democracy, as she said. All of us want to see elections around the country effectively and efficiently run, and it is vital that that process has the confidence of electors, candidates and the political parties. Better access and enhanced confidence in the system will be achieved only if the system is working effectively and is managed professionally.
	My hon. Friend set out a number of concerns about the recent elections in Warrington, and she highlighted some important and serious issues arising from them. They are a matter of grave concern, especially if it is the case that electors are denied the right to vote as a result of any shortcomings in how the election is administered. She is quite right to say that the points that she has raised merit further investigation.
	As my hon. Friend will appreciate, I do not speak for Warrington council. I have to say that I am rather pleased to be in that position, after hearing about her experience. However, my Department has contacted the authority to obtain some of the background to the issues involved, and I understand that the monitoring officer for the council is instigating a comprehensive review of the election with some independent support being provided to gather evidence. I understand that the issues that my hon. Friend and others have raised and the representations that they have made will be fed into that review, and she will be invited to give her views more directly. I believe that the review will conclude in the late summer.
	As a result of my hon. Friend securing this debate, I shall ensure that the report of it in  Hansard is sent to the monitoring officer and the Electoral Commission, which is also examining the way in which the elections in Warrington were conducted as part of its own evaluation of the 2008 elections. The commission will visit Warrington in July, and I hope that my hon. Friend will take the opportunity, if she can, to meet it to discuss some of her particular concerns.
	I do not wish to prejudge the outcome of that review, but I want to make a couple of comments on some of the issues that my hon. Friend raised. It certainly appears that the changes made to the location of a number of the polling stations prior to polling day were not published on the council's website. That clearly is not at all satisfactory, and it is one of issues that I hope will be examined properly in the review. I am particularly concerned about my hon. Friend's description of the fact that a number of polling stations lacked access for the elderly and the disabled. That is a clear duty that the returning officer and the administrators of an election have to fulfil as part of the conduct of elections. I hope that the review will look at that point in great detail, and I am sure that the Electoral Commission will look seriously at any authority that does not do its absolute utmost to ensure that those least able to get to a polling station have the opportunity to do so.
	With regard to the delivery of poll cards, I understand that the picture is not entirely clear. I am told that the council was made aware prior to polling day of problems in some wards and that as a result it took steps using different channels, including radio, press and the internet, so that people would know that they could vote without using their poll cards.